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LIMITED, CONDITIONAL, AND SUSPENDED
DISCHARGES IN ANGLO-AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDINGS
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFFt
"On the whole, Gentlemen, I think I may safely say, that this
Statute would have been more acceptable had it breathed somewhat less
strongly the spirit of commerce, and somewhat less feebly the spirit of
justice and humanity."1 So spoke John MacQueen in 1851 during a
lecture at Lincoln's Inn. His topic was the 1849 English bankruptcy
statute.2 The object of his criticism was the debtor discharge provision
found in the new legislation. 3 Today, the passage of more than 130
years has not diminished the debate concerning the propriety and the
form of discharge policy in bankruptcy legislation.4
t Professor of Law, Indiana University. A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1955, Harvard University. I
would like to acknowledge the helpful assistance of Mr. J.A. Boxhall and the library staff at the
Institute for Advanced Legal Studies in London; Mr. Registrar Parbury of London; Mr. Registrar
Williams of Cardiff; Edward Schrager, J.D. 1980, Indiana University; and Timothy Conway,
Indiana University Class of 1984. My colleagues Bryant Garth and Dirk Hartog, and Steven
Harris of the Wayne State Law Faculty offered helpful criticisms of a draft of this Article. Fi-
nally, I owe a special debt to Ian Fletcher, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University College of
Wales, David Graham of the Middle Temple, and John F. O'Reilly, Official Receiver, London.
Each one of these men patiently answered all my questions about English bankruptcy practice and
provided many valuable suggestions for the improvement of this Article.
I J.F. MacQueen, A Lecture on the Early History and Academic Discipline of the Inns of
Court and Chancery Delivered Before the Benchers at Lincoln's Inn 23 (Nov. 20, 1851) (copy on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter cited as MacQueen Lecture].
2 An Act to amend and consolidate the Laws relating to Bankrupts, 12 & 13 Vict., ch. 106
(1849).
1 Id. §§ 198-207, 256; MacQueen Lecture, supra note 1, at 17-23.
4 A good example of the controversy that can be generated by discharge legislation is found
in the history of what is now 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981). This provision, which
controls the dischargeability of certain educational loans, first appeared in a somewhat different
form as § 439A(a) of the Educational Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-492, 90 Stat. 2081,
2141. The House Judiciary Committee did not recommend that the section be included in the
bankruptcy bill that was sent to the House floor; however, a floor amendment added it back into
the bill. H.R. REP. No. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 132, 536-38, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6423-25. Thirty pages of the House report are devoted to this one
subject. Id. at 131-62, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6093-123. This was a remarkably
detailed analysis in view of the other important bankruptcy issues before the House at that time.
See also S. REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5785, 5865 (Senate comments on the provision); 124 CONG. REC. 32,399 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6436, 6454 (remarks of House leaders).
One measure of an issue's controversial nature is the extent to which it receives press and
television coverage. Bankruptcy has not been a topic of great public interest-until recently. For
instance, a recent MacNeil-Lehrer TV broadcast was devoted entirely to personal bankruptcy
discharge policy. Transcript, The MacNeil-Lehrer Report (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 8,
1981). See also a recent four-part series on bankruptcy in the New York Times. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 30, 1982, at Al, col. 1; Oct. 1, 1982, at Al, col. 2; Oct. 2, 1982, at Al, col. 3; Oct. 4, 1982,
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Discharging the debtor from monetary obligations to her creditors
is one possible result of a bankruptcy proceeding.5 The bankruptcy dis-
charge is a central feature of Anglo-American bankruptcy law; how-
ever, it is absent from continental legal systems such as those of France,
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.6 The first bankruptcy discharge
was authorized by a statute enacted in 1705 during the reign of Queen
Anne.7 Since then there have been several significant shifts in English
discharge policy. Changes can also be seen in American discharge pol-
icy as it evolved during the nineteenth century. That period witnessed
the enactment of four separate bankruptcy statutes, and each one con-
tained different discharge features.8 The legislative changes in both
countries resulted from shifts in the balance of legislative power from
creditor to debtor interests and shifts in society's perception of the pub-
lic interest in debtor rehabilitation.
Factors which may influence a legislature when it adopts a partic-
ular discharge rule include the perceived desirability of having each
bankrupt's eligibility for discharge dependent on the particular facts of
at Al, col. 4.
5 But it is not an inevitable result. Not all debtors receive a discharge and not all debts are
discharged. Early English bankruptcy laws, for example, did not provide for any discharge. See,
e.g., An act against such persons as do make bankrupts, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542).
If the law simply wipes out the claims altogether, we may be dealing with an eco-
nomic measure of the highest importance, but it is not bankruptcy. Such laws, let us
remember, are not unexampled in history. At various times in ancient society there
was a demand that all debts be cancelled as of a certain date. The Biblical Jubilee
and the Athenian seisachtheia seem to have been measures of this sort. The Roman
tabulae novae undoubtedly constituted one ...
It may be well to remember that an effective cancellation can be obtained not
only by the formal Roman expedient of tabulae novae, but by a deliberate and
immense inflation. This was the case in Germany before 1923, when the circulating
medium was reduced in value below the paper it was printed on and was nonethe-
less legal tender for pre-existing debts. Whatever this method is called, it can
scarcely be called one of bankruptcy.
Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1940) (footnotes omitted).
6 1 J.H. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY §
1.07[1] (1979) [hereinafter cited as DALHUISEN]; J.A. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY § 123 (1956). It should be noted that some civil law countries do have a discharge
system as part of their bankruptcy law, but discharge is always conditional on the approval of
some majority of the bankrupt's creditors. See also J.H. DALHUISEN, COMPOSITIONS IN BANK-
RUPTCY 2 (1968).
' An Act to prevent Frauds frequently committed by Bankrupts, 4 & 5 Anne, ch. 17, § 8
(1705). Not all debtors were eligible for bankruptcy, but for those who were, the Act provided
complete relief. See id. §§ 6, 8, 18 (classes of debtors eligible for discharge); id. §§ 7, 13, 16, 19
(classes of debtors ineligible for discharge). It discharged all debts existing when the proceeding
was commenced and was available even if creditors objected. Id. §§ 8, 20. This generous provision
lasted one year. In 1706 Parliament imposed a requirement that four-fifths of the creditors in
number and amount consent to the granting of the discharge. An Act to explain and amend an Act
of the last Session of Parliament for preventing Frauds frequently committed by Bankrupts, 6
Anne, ch. 22, § 2 (1706).
3 Three of the statutes had short lives, see infra note 145, and it was not until 1898 that
bankruptcy legislation became a permanent part of federal law. See generally C. WARREN, BANK-
RUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935).
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her case, the value society places on the activities of the credit extender,
and the degree to which a fresh-start policy is seen as desirable. When
the court enjoys discretionary authority to order discharge, these same
factors, along with the debtor's actual situation (for example, her char-
acter, ability to make further payments, circumstances under which she
incurred the obligations, and willingness to cooperate with the bank-
ruptcy administration), may influence the manner in which the statute
is applied. To some extent, the considerations that shape discharge pol-
icy cannot be reconciled and difficult choices must be made. In the
United States, we have chosen to make many of these difficult choices
by legislative rule rather than rely on the exercise of judicial discretion.
As a result, the discharge process in the United States can be, as we
shall see, rather inflexible. Theoretically, it is open to exploitation. Al-
though there are few documented cases of abuse, creditors remain con-
vinced that the bankruptcy courts are crowded with debtors who really
could honor their obligations if only they made an honest effort.9
The English system is not subject to the same criticism. Its judges
have the power, through application of rules of condition and suspen-
sion, to respond to creditor demands for further payment. It is this fea-
ture which commends it to American creditors.
From time to time it has been asserted that we should make
greater use of rules of condition and suspension. Although rejected in
the past, the argument continues to be made. 0 Accordingly, the English
9 Documentation of abuse of the bankruptcy process tends to be rather anecdotal. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. NO. 595, supra note 4, at 158-59, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6119-20
(letter of Ronald J. Iverson, exec. dir. of Vt. Student Assist. Corp.) But see Bankruptcy Act
Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1072-75, 1087-89, 1120-21,
1122-27 (1976) (statistical information on increase in student loan recipients' defaults and bank-
ruptcies) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act Revision]; see also R. DOLPHIN, AN ANALYSIS OF
ECONOMIC & PERSONAL FACTORS LEADING TO CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 110-11 (1965) (statisti-
cal study of personal bankruptcy in one Michigan county during 1963). The transgressions of an
Arkansas couple often were cited during hearings on the appropriate treatment of student loans.
Bankruptcy Act Revision, supra, at 1066, 1068, 1101-03, 1121-22. See generally CREDIT RE-
SEARCH CENTER, MONOGRAPH NO. 23, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY (VOL. 1): CONSUMER'S
RIGHT TO BANKRUPTCY, ORIGINS AND EFFECTS 72 (1982) (recent study by the Credit Research
Center of Purdue University's Krannert Graduate School of Management) [hereinafter cited as
Purdue Study]:
Depending upon all the assumptions made, 15 percent to 30 percent of bankrupt
debtors probably could repay all of their nonmortgage debts out of their future
income, while as many as 37.4 percent of bankrupt debtors probably could repay at
least half their debts out of future income. . . . Because consumers typically bor-
row against future income rather than assets, only five percent of the respondents
could repay their debts by liquidating assets, and half of those would not have been
able to repay their debts from future income.
But see N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1982, at A30, col. 5 (letter-to-the-editor written by author of this
Article criticizing the Purdue Study, supra).
10 Professor MacLachlan suggested importation of the English system of conditional and sus-
pended discharges because he thought it would introduce a helpful degree of flexibility into bank-
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attitude toward relief from debt is of general interest to the American
legal community: those who understand what actually takes place in
English bankruptcy courts will also understand the potential impact of
current proposals for changes in our own discharge policy."
The purpose of this Article is to contrast British and American
discharge policy. Part I of this Article briefly defines three types of
debtor discharge rules: rules of condition, rules of suspension, and rules
of limitation. Parts II and III demonstrate how the English bankruptcy
courts actually deal with the debtors that come before them. Part IV
offers an explanation of how two common law jurisdictions with simi-
lar legal traditions came to choose radically different techniques for rec-
onciling debtor and creditor interests. Finally, Part V discusses current
proposals for revision of the American bankruptcy statutes and suggests
that adoption of rules of condition and suspension would require a rad-
ical rethinking of the roles American society expects bankruptcy judges
to perform.
I. DEFINING LIMITED, CONDITIONAL, AND
SUSPENDED DISCHARGES
The terms "limitation," "condition," and "suspension" refer to
discrete techniques for reconciling the interests of the debtor, the credi-
tor, and the public in a bankruptcy proceeding. A limited discharge is
one that is available only to certain classes of debtors,"2 that may be
ruptcy discharge practice. He did not, however, support the use of bankruptcy proceedings as an
additional collection device. J.A. MACLACHLAN, supra note 6, § 122. But cf. id. § 100 ("the
prospect of a discharge serves ... to induce compliance with the Bankruptcy Act as a branch of
collection law"). The most forceful brief for importation of the English practice is found in AT-
TORNEY GENERAL MITCHELL, STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, S.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. xii, 17-19, 57-58, 99-103 (1932). It has been suggested
that a debtor's eligibility for discharge should include a consideration of the value of human capi-
tal. See Discussion, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1977, at 123, 156-58, 161. For a discussion of proposals to force the use of old Chapter XIII, see
Wage Earner Plans Under the Bankruptcy Act: Hearings on H.R. 1057 and H.R. 5771 Before
Sibcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Comment,
Should Chapter XIII Bankruptcy Be Involuntary?, 44 TEX. L. REV. 533 (1966); Countryman,
Proposed New Amendments for Chapter XIII, 22 BUS. LAW. 1151 (1967); Driver, Proposal-To
Amend the Bankruptcy Act to Require that Consideration be Given to the Use of Chapt. XIII, 18
PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 41 (1964). The Bankruptcy Commission rejected a proposal for involuntary
Chapter XIII proceedings primarily on pragmatic grounds. See Report of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. DOG. NO. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 83,
158-59 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTCY REPORT].
The treatment of student loans in the new Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. V
1981), suggests a limited acceptance of the concept of conditional discharge in the United States.
The debtor's future earning power may also be considered when determining whether a (new)
Chapter 13 plan can be confirmed. See id. § 1325(a)(3),(6); infra text accompanying notes 178-79.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 166-231.
" See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981) (no debtor can receive a second discharge
within six years of receiving most recent discharge).
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denied to persons within the eligible class, 3 or that does not discharge
certain types of obligations.14 Limited discharge legislation contem-
plates only two courses of action: the debtor receives either an immedi-
ate discharge or none at all. The court has no discretion; it merely
applies inflexible rules. For example, in the United States the debtor is
not entitled to a discharge in a liquidation proceeding if she has re-
ceived a discharge in another liquidation proceeding during the
preceeding six years.15 This is an absolute rule, and the court cannot
grant a second discharge within the six-year period even if it is con-
vinced that the debtor really needs and deserves such relief. Conversely,
the court is not authorized to deny a discharge when more than six
years separate the two proceedings even if it believes that the debtor
really does not need rehabilitative relief.
Conditional discharge rules, on the other hand, authorize the court
to consider how much the debtor has paid, or will be able to pay, credi-
tors. Such rules may, but need not, permit the exercise of discretion.
For instance, the short-lived American Bankruptcy Act of 1867 con-
tained two conditional limitations on the grant of a discharge. 6 A
debtor could not obtain a discharge if her estate paid unsecured credi-
tors less than fifty percent of the outstanding debts (condition 1-no
discretion) unless a majority of her creditors in number and amount
consented to her discharge (condition 2-discretion to be exercised).
17
Rules of condition are pervasive in English bankruptcy law, 8 but gen-
erally have not played a role in the American system. However, section
523(a)(8) of the new bankruptcy code declares nondischargeable a debt
owed
for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a govern-
mental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in
part by a governmental unit or a non-profit institution of higher
education, unless-
s See, e.g., id. § 727(a)(2)-(9) (certain debtor conduct can result in denial of discharge).
14 See, e.g., id. § 523(a)(1), (2) (certain tax claims not affected by bankruptcy discharge);
Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 28(1)(a), amended by Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60,
§ 8(a) (same).
1' 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981).
1 Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, 533. A more rigorous rule applied to
the debtor who had already received a bankruptcy discharge in a prior proceeding. Id. § 30, 14
Stat. 517, 532.
" Note that in this case the statute authorizes the creditors, not the court, to exercise discre-
tion. As is discussed infra text accompanying notes 136-44, however, the legislatures of both coun-
tries have since concluded that creditors may abuse this discretion and therefore all present condi-
tional discharge rules place discretion with the court.
'8 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 26, amended by Bankruptcy (Amended)
Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 7, § 1, and amended by Criminal Law Act, 1967, ch. 58, § 10(2),
sched. 3, Pt. III, and amended by Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60, §§ 6, 8(9) [hereinafter cited as
Bankruptcy Act of 1914, § 26].
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(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this para-
graph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor's dependents."9
This rule is one of condition-it invites the court to look at the earning
power of the debtor and to decide whether some or all of the loan can
be repaid out of future earnings.
A final technique is suspension of the discharge for a stated period
of time. Suspended discharges are authorized expressly by statute in
England and Wales and permit a court to express displeasure with the
debtor's conduct by temporarily withholding the full benefits of dis-
charge.2 ° Courts in the United States, acting under the now-repealed
Bankruptcy Act of 1898,21 occasionally withheld discharges for a lim-
ited period of time to allow a creditor to perfect his claim against the
bankrupt.22
With this basic understanding of limited, conditional, and sus-
pended discharges, it is possible to examine English and American
bankruptcy law with the objective of understanding how the respective
laws reflect different functions and societal expectations.
19 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981).
,0 Bankruptcy Act of 1914, § 26, supra note 18. Under a system in which the debtor's
postpetition earnings remain available to pay creditors, a suspended discharge theoretically could
also be used to reach those earnings. In practice, the English bankruptcy courts use conditional
discharges and suspended discharges to achieve different objectives. See infra text accompanying
notes 116-17 & 129-32 (Hearings Numbers Two and Five).
21 Oh. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1979).
2 In Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903), the Supreme Court held that the
bankruptcy court could withhold the discharge for a reasonable period of time to permit a creditor
with a waiver of exemption to obtain a judicial lien on otherwise exempt property. Courts also
withheld discharges until joint creditors of a husband and wife could obtain judicial liens on prop-
erty held as tenants by the entirety. See, e.g., Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1931).
See generally IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T1 14.64, 16.06 U. Moore 14th ed. 1978) (Postpone-
ment of discharge pending the determination of a suit or proceeding in which persons other than
the bankrupt are parties is appropriate where a discharge would tend to affect adversely the rights
of such persons).
It may be that the practice of suspending a discharge when exempt property is involved will
not be continued under the new bankruptcy statute. The Lockwood decision, which had author-
ized suspension, has been overruled; waivers of exemption are no longer enforceable. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 522(0, 541(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 126-27, 177-78,
362, 367-68, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6087-88, 6137-38, 6318, 6323-24; S. REP.
NO. 989, supra note 4, at 82, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5868; see also In re Lantz,
7 Bankr. 77, 79-80 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio) (even exempt property passes to trustee). But one court
has suggested that the practice will continue for the joint creditor seeking to enforce a claim
against an entire estate. See In re Ford, 3 Bankr. 559, 576 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (dictum), afld,
638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1981). But see In re Trickett, 14 Bankr. 85 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981)
(creditors need not obtain a judgment in state court because under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the debtor's interest in property owned by tenancy by the
entirety and could dispose of said interest).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS IN
ENGLAND AND WALES
2 3
A. Institution of Proceedings
Bankruptcy proceedings in England and Wales may be either vol-
untary or involuntary from the debtor's perspective.24 A voluntary pro-
ceeding is initiated easily by the debtor25 if she is eligible for bank-
ruptcy. If, however, the proceeding is involuntary, commenced upon the
petition of one or more creditors, several additional requirements must
be satisfied. The petition must demonstrate, among other things, a liq-
uidated debt owed to the petitioner(s) amounting to at least £200 and
the commission of an act of bankruptcy. 26 The Bankruptcy Act of 1914
lists eight acts of bankruptcy;2 7 many are similar to the acts of bank-
ruptcy required for a creditor's petition under our recently repealed
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.28 One example common to both systems
would be the making of a fraudulent conveyance.29
Failure to respond to a bankruptcy notice is a uniquely English
justification for a creditor's petition.3 0 A creditor with a final judgment
or order may apply to the court for issuance of a bankruptcy no-
" The bankruptcy process described in this Article is not generally operative in Scotland or
Northern Ireland. See Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 169(2). Throughout this
Article the term "England" refers to both England and Wales.
3' Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, §§ 4, 6, amended by Insolvency Act, 1976,
ch. 60, § I (minimum amount required for petition).
2" The bankruptcy statute applies only to natural persons. It contains a definition which
could be interpreted as including a corporation within the class of eligible debtors. Bankruptcy
Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 1(2). Another section of the statute, however, makes it clear
that a separate liquidation procedure applies to all corporations and certain partnerships. Id. §
126.
28 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59 § 4, amended by Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60,
§ 1, sched. 1.
" Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 1(1), amended by Insolvency Act, 1976, ch.
60, § 4. Other statutes have created additional acts of bankruptcy. See, e.g., Administration of
Justice Act, 1970, ch. 31, § 29(3); Attachment of Earnings Act, 1971, ch. 32, § 4(3). For a general
discussion, see M. HUNTER & D. GRAHAM, WILLIAMS AND MUIR HUNTER ON BANKRUPTCY 2
(19th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS & HUNTER].
2 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 3, 30 Stat. 544, 546-47 (repealed 1979). The current
American bankruptcy statute does not use the term "act of bankruptcy." A more functional basis
has been established for determining when creditors may invoke the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (Supp. V 1981); S. REP. NO. 989, supra note 4, at 34, 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5820. A recent study sponsored by the English government recom-
mended the abolition of acts of bankruptcy. CORK, INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT OF
THE REVIEW COMMITTEE, CMD. 8558, 529-531 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CORK, FINAL
REPORT].
2 Compare Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 3(a)(1), 30 Stat. 544, 546 (repealed 1979)
with Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 29, § l(1)(b).
30 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 29, § 1(1)(g), amended by Insolvency Act, 1976,
ch. 60, § 4.
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tice 31-a formal demand for payment. 2 The debtor then has ten days
in which to discharge the obligation. 3 English law also provides for a
response by affidavit showing that there is a setoff to the creditor's
claim.3 4 If the allegations and the affidavit are satisfactory, the court
will schedule a hearing to determine the merits of the averred setoff.35
A debtor who does not file such an affidavit and who fails to discharge
the obligation stated in the bankruptcy notice within ten days commits
an act of bankruptcy and is subject to an involuntary petition.36
Under American law, failure to respond to a demand for payment
is not an act of bankruptcy. The disparate treatment accorded to such
failures reflects the somewhat different ways English and American
creditors view the bankruptcy process. In the United States, a creditor
looks to the bankruptcy court for assistance when other creditors have
gained an undue advantage by using the state-law-authorized collection
process. A bankruptcy proceeding substitutes a more even-handed and
orderly system of collection and distribution for the individualistic state
collection law which Professor MacLachlan once aptly referred to as
"grab law."' 7
In England there is an appreciation of the fact that individual col-
lection law and bankruptcy law are, in a sense, opposites. 8 But funda-
31 Id. Original jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings is divided between two courts, the
High Court and the county courts. In the case of debtors residing in the London bankruptcy
district, the petition will be filed with the High Court. For debtors residing outside London, the
appropriate place to file is with the county court. Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, §§
96, 98. In both courts provision is made for a bankruptcy official, called a registrar, who has a
function similar to our bankruptcy judge. The registrar in the county court system, however, does
not have as extensive powers as a High Court registrar. In the county courts, some bankruptcy
matters must be heard by the county court judge. And in both courts some matters are completely
outside the jurisdiction of the registrars. In both the High Court and the county courts, a bank-
ruptcy notice is issued by the registrar. Id. §§ 96, 98, amended by Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60, §
8(9); Bankruptcy Rules, 1952, STAT. INST. 1952 NO. 2113, R. 4, R. 135(1), R. 136, amended by
Bankruptcy (Amend. No. 2) Rules, 1956, STAT. INST. 1956 NO. 1197, R. 1(d), amended by Bank-
ruptcy (Amend.) Rules, 1965, STAT. INST. 1965 NO. 1571, R. I(d). A brief account of the devel-
opment of High Court and county court bankruptcy jurisdiction appears in I.F. FLETCHER, LAW
OF BANKRUPTCY 7-8 (1978). Throughout this Article the term "bankruptcy court" or "bankruptcy
judge" refers to the court that has jurisdiction to make the ruling.
32 For an example of the form of a bankruptcy notice, see WILLIAMS & HUNTER, supra note
27, at 653-54.
33 See id.
"I Bankruptcy Rules, 1952, STAT. INST. 1952 No. 2113, R. 137(b), R. 138, R. 139.
35 Id. R. 139(1).
36 See WILLIAMS & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 653-54.
31 J.A. MACLACHLAN, supra note 10, § 5.
38 The creditor who initiates bankruptcy proceedings must share whatever is collected with
other creditors. First priority in distribution, however, is given to the payment of certain tax and
wage claims. Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 33(1)-(2), amended by Bankruptcy
(Amendment) Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 7, § 2, and amended by Reinstatement in Civil
Employment Act, 1944, 7 & 8 Geo. 6, ch. 15, § 18(1), (4), and amended by Companies Act, 1947,
10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 47, §§ 9(1)-(2), (4)-(6), 115(1), (6), and amended by National Service Act, 11
& 12 Geo. 6, ch. 64, § 48, and amended by Finance Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6, ch. 33, § 30(1),
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mentally, bankruptcy still is regarded as a part, albeit a distinctive part,
of the collection process. As Ian Fletcher tells us:
[Alithough [English bankrutpcy law] is primarily intended to be
employed in cases where the debtor is materially unable to pay his
debts out of his liquid resources, it should be noted that there is a
possibility of its being resorted to in cases where a debtor, although
able to pay, refuses to do so. Thus, the law of bankruptcy also
constitues a further species of "ultimate weapon" with which the
creditor may contrive to recover what is owed to him."9
Similarly, 9 recent government-sponsored study of English insolvency
law notes:
[T]he insolvency laws are treated by the trading community as
an important instrument in the process of debt recovery; the threat
or imminence of insolvency proceedings as a weapon in persuading
a defaulting debtor to pay or make proposals for the settlement of a
debt cannot be underestimated as it constitutes, in the majority of
cases, the sanction of last resort for the enforcement of
obligations.40
Through use of the bankruptcy notice, a creditor may create the
substantive basis for a bankruptcy petition and then threaten to com-
mence bankruptcy proceedings. This practice must often be effective, as
there is evidence that creditors make ample use of the power to threaten
use of bankruptcy. Each year from 1974 to 1979, bankruptcy notices
issued by the High Court and by the county courts have exceeded cred-
itors' involuntary petitions by ratios varying from approximately three-
and amended by Purchase Tax Act, 1963, ch. 9, § 30(1), and amended by Finance Act, 1965, ch.
26, § 45(12), sched. 10, pt. II, para. 15(1), and amended by Land Commission Act, 1967, ch. 1, §
77, sched. 12, para. 12, and amended by Statute Law (Repeals) Act, 1975, ch. 10, § 1(1), sched.
pt. I, and amended by Social Security (Consequential Provisons) Act, 1975, ch. 18, §§ 1(3), 5,
sched. 2, para. 2, and amended by Social Security Pensions Act, 1975, ch. 60, § 65(1), sched. 4,
para. 2, and amended by Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, §§ 63, 67(2), and amended by
Development Land Tax Act, 1976, ch. 24, § 42, and amended by Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60, §
1(1), (3), sched. 1, pt. I, pt. II, para. 5, and amended by Employment Protection (Consolidation)
Act, 1978, ch. 44, §§ 121, 125, and amended by Bankruptcy Rules, 1952, STAT. INST. 1952 No.
2113, R. 249. Inland Revenue and H.M. Custom and Excise are frequent users of involuntary
bankruptcy. See CORK, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, W 529-531, 727; infra note 152.
39 I.F. FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 3. Currently there is a substantial amount of debate
concerning the administration of the English bankruptcy system. The Thatcher Government has
indicated a desire to reduce the government's involvement in the administrative process. Supporters
and critics of these proposals both acknowledge that consideration must be given to whether this
will affect the usefulness of bankruptcy as a debt collection device. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
TRADE, BANKRUPTCY, A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, CMD. 7967, at 9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
TRADE BANKRUPTCY]; CORK, BANKRUPTCY, INTERIM REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW REVIEW
COMMITTEE, CMD. 7968, at 4-5 [hereinafter cited as CORK, INTERIM REPORT]; Fletcher, Bank-
ruptcy Law Reform: The Interim Report of the Cork Committee, and the Department of Trade
Green Paper, 44 MOD. L. REV. 77, 84-85 ('1981).
40 CORK, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, 1 235.
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to-one to five-to-one.41 At least part of the disparity between the num-
ber of notices and the number of involuntary petitions exists because
debtors, having received the notice, make arrangements for payment
and forestall the institution of bankruptcy proceedings."'
If the petition, whether based upon a bankruptcy notice or any
other act of bankruptcy, is properly presented, the court will issue a
receiving order.4 This order protects the bankruptcy estate; most credi-
tor collection activity is stayed 44 and the debtor is divested of control of
his property.45 Adjudication, however, is not the next step. Prior to an
41
High Court County Court
Chancery Division
Bankruptcy Creditors' Bankruptcy Creditors'
Notices Petitions Notices Petitions
1974 8,637 2,066 21,731 3,904
1975 9,618 2,560 27,342 4,860
1976 8,401 2,560 23,096 5,234
1977 7,068 2,464 13,123 2,372
1978 6,307 2,479 11,327 2,336
1979 6,230 2,403 10,769 2,120
LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPT., JUDICIAL STATISTICS: ENGLAND AND WALES, CMDS. 6634, 6875,
7254, 7627, 7977 (1975-1979).
42 See P. ROCK, MAKING PEOPLE PAY 148-50 (1973). Prior to 1970 creditors rarely used
bankruptcy notices except to "scare" debtors, and "overwhelmingly resort[ed] to executions and
judgment summonses alone" to enforce judgments. Id. The Administration of Justice Act, 1970,
ch. 31, §§ 11-30, scheds. 4-8, amended by Attachment of Earnings Act, 1971, ch. 32, § 29(2),
however, severely restricted use of both of these devices. Consequently, creditors appear to have
been increasingly resorting to forcing bankruptcy upon debtors as a means of enforcing payment of
judgment debts. CORK, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 39, at 4-5. This fact makes even more nota-
ble the difference between the number of bankruptcy notices and creditor petitions during the
1970s. See supra note 41.
During the debates on the Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60, both the Government and the opposi-
tion were concerned about the possible effect of the Act on the use of bankruptcy as a debt collec-
tion device. See id.; 906 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1465, 1477-79, 1488 (1976) (remarks of Mr.
C. Davis and Mr. Percival).
There is no counterpart to the bankruptcy notice in the acts of bankruptcy listed in the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 3, 30 Stat. 544, 546 (repealed 1979). An undischarged judicial
lien or the appointment of a receiver were the only acts of bankruptcy that the creditor could
create unilaterally. Courts constructed an estoppel doctrine to prevent creditors from using acts of
bankruptcy for which they were responsible as the basis of an involuntary petition. See, e.g., In re
Maryanov, 20 F.2d 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1927) (judicial lien). See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 59.39
(J. Moore & L. King 14th ed. 1977).
4' Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 3.
" Id. § 7(1). However, secured creditors may still "realise or otherwise deal with" their
security. Id. § 7(2). Thus, the stay effect of a receiving order is not as extensive as the automatic
stay provisions of the American bankruptcy statute. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), (b) (Supp. V
1981) with Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 7.
41 At this point in time, the debtor still has title to the property but the Official Receiver, see
infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text, is entitled to possession of the property. Rhodes v. Daw-
son, 16 Q.B.D. 548 (1886). For a general discussion of the effect of the receiving order, see I.F.
FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 96-99.
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adjudication, there is a meeting of creditors.4 At this meeting creditors
may vote upon any plan offered by the debtor for a composition of
debts. Absent acceptance of such a proposal, formal adjudication will
follow. In most individual bankruptcies, this first meeting of creditors is
a statutory formality-an adjudication routinely follows issuance of the
receiving order.
B. The Official Receiver and the Public Examination
Prior to 1883, a -trustee in bankruptcy selected by creditors was
assigned sole responsibility for administering the bankrupt's estate.47
The 1883 legislation significantly changed bankruptcy administration
by creating the office of Official Receiver.4 Although this governmental
official did not then, and does not now, displace the private trustee,49
the position carries substantial responsibilities, particularly in the area
of discharge. Specifically, section 73 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1914
provides:
As regards the debtor, it shall be the duty of the official receiver-
(a) to investigate the conduct of the debtor and to report to
the court, stating whether there is reason to believe that the
debtor has committed any act which constitutes a misde-
meanour under this Act . . . or which would justify the
court in refusing, suspending or qualifying an order for his
discharge ....
(c) To take part as may be directed by the Board of Trade in
the public examination of the debtor ... 0
The public examination51 is a distinctive and controversial feature
of the English bankruptcy process. The debtor, standing in the witness
box 52 and usually unrepresented by counsel,53 is examined in open
46 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 13(1).
47 See An Act to consolidate and amend the Law of Bankruptcy, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 71, §
14(1) (1869).
45 1. CRUCHLEY, A HANDBOOK ON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2-3 (2d ed. 1964);
Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226, 230 (1976); CORK,
FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, 49-52. The creation of the office of the Official Receiver was
prompted by criticism of the trustee system. Id.
49 There are, however, situations in which the Official Receiver may also serve as trustee.
See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 129, amended by Insolvency Act, 1976,
ch. 60, § 1(1), sched. 1, pt. I (property of the debtor not in excess of Z4000). See also WILLIAMS &
HUNTER, supra note 27, at 102; CORK, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, 1 684-690.
60 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 73.
65 Id. § 15.
62 In both the public examination and the discharge hearing, the debtor stands in the witness
box unless, on account of illness or infirmity, the court permits her to sit. Being so exposed to the
spectators, the judge, and the Official Receiver must increase the sense of helplessness which many
debtors doubtlessly experience.
"' But see infra text accompanying notes 129-32 (Hearing Number Five). Legal Aid is avail-
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court concerning the affairs and events that led to the bankruptcy. This
examination, which is held as soon as possible54 after the debtor has
supplied the Official Receiver with a statement of affairs, is justified on
several grounds. Writing in 1975, Justice (a committee of the British
Section of the International Commission of Jurists) suggested four his-
torical reasons for the institution:
(a) Investigatory, i.e., to discover the true state of the bankrupt's
affairs and the causes of his failure, [and] to locate his assets...
[that] are capable of being recovered by the trustee in bankruptcy
for the general body of creditors.
(b) Informative, i.e., to acquaint the creditors as well as the public
at large with the circumstances of the bankruptcy, to give an op-
portunity to those creditors to question the debtor and also,
through publicity, to make known to other creditors, whose exis-
tence may not have been disclosed by the debtor or otherwise come
to light, the fact that bankruptcy has taken place.
(c) Protective, i.e., to warn potential future creditors of the bank-
rupt's previous conduct and also, through the publicity attaching to
the examination, to have a deterrent or perhaps reformative effect
upon members of the trading community, in particular by improv-
ing the standards of commercial practice and integrity.
(d) Precautionary, i.e., to ascertain whether the bankrupt ought
ever to be relieved of those disabilities which are imposed upon
him by virtue of his status as a bankrupt and also from the stigma
to which such status still appears to expose him in the eyes of
society generally.5"
Much of the questioning in the public examination relates to the
causes of the debtor's bankruptcy. One of the Official Receiver's main
concerns is to establish the existence of any facts that will have to be
considered when the debtor later applies for a discharge.56 The bank-
ruptcy statute provides that once the oath is administered, it shall be
the debtor's duty
to answer all such questions as the court may put or allow to be
put to him. Such notes of the examination as the court thinks
able to some debtors involved in bankruptcy proceedings but few can or do take advantage of it.
JUSTICE, BANKRUPTCY 32-33 (1975).
4 I.F. FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 111.
8' JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 18-19.
The significance of these facts is discussed infra text accompanying notes 79-82. The bank-
rupt's concurrence in the Official Receiver's conclusion that certain facts have been established can
be used against him at a later date. See infra text accompanying notes 119-22 (Hearing Number
Three).
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proper shall be taken down in writing, and shall be read over ei-
ther to or by the debtor and signed by him, and may thereafter,
save as in this Act provided, be used in evidence against him
57
The debtor may not refuse to answer on the ground that the answer
will be self-incriminating, 5 although in appropriate cases the court has
the authority to adjourn the public examination until related criminal
proceedings against the bankrupt have been concluded."
The public examination, which must be a terribly humiliating ex-
perience even when no spectators are in the courtroom, dramatically
brings home to the debtor the fact that, until she receives her discharge,
she is a second class citizen.6 0 She is specifically asked questions at the
close of the public examination which test her knowledge of the disabil-
ities imposed upon an undischarged bankrupt. And she is asked
whether, and to what extent, she is willing to make so-called voluntary
payments out of postpetition earnings for the benefit of her creditors.
The debtor who claims inability to make such payments may be
warned by the court that failure to do so will have an adverse effect
upon her eventual application for a discharge. The bankruptcy dis-
charge is often, in effect, purchased by postpetition payments, and the
public examination provides a good opportunity for alerting the debtor
to the realties of her situation.
There have been criticisms of the public examination and propos-
als that its use be sharply curtailed. Justice summarized several argu-
ments against the practice:
(a) The examination is frequently no more than a formality, a
waste of time and quite unnecessary in that it elicits no . . . useful
information ....
(b) It is unjustifiably costly, in particular, having regard to the
time and energy devoted to its preparation by the Official Receiver
and his staff, on the one hand, and the lack of any worthwhile
information obtained thereby, on the other, both in relation to the
recovery of assets and regarding the true causes of the bankrupt's
failure.
(c) The debtor is given no real opportunity at the examination to
defend himself, the occasions on which he will be legally repre-
sented . . . being rare ....
(h) The public examination has outlived any usefulness it may
Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 15(8).
" In re Paget [1927] 2 Ch. 85.
' Bankruptcy Rules, 1952, STAT. INST. 1952 NO. 2113, R. 192A.
o See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
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once have been thought to possess and it is no longer necessary to
expose bankrupts to the indignity which it occasions."
Accordingly, Justice proposed that
in cases where the unsecured liabilities disclosed by the debtor in
his Statement of Affairs are less than £10,000, . . . the present
law should be altered and. . . there should be no public examina-
tion unless (i) the court is satisfied upon the application of the
Official Receiver, the trustee in bankruptcy or a creditor, that such
a hearing should take place, or (ii) the debtor has been bankrupt
on a previous [sic] occasion.6
2
An outsider, interested in the process by which a debtor receives a
discharge, may not share Justice's view that the public examination is
often nonfunctional. As we will see shortly, most debtors accept the fact
that they must pay for their freedom.6" It is likely that the humiliating
public examination is not an insigificant factor contributing to the will-
ingness of debtors, as a class, to pay without protest whatever is neces-
sary to purchase their discharge. It may not produce much useful infor-
mation, but it provides an excellent vehicle for warning the debtor that
payment is expected. It is doubtful that the same warning delivered in
another fashion, such as by letter or by the Official Receiver outside the
courtroom, would have as great an impact upon the debtor. In a sense,
the public examination alerts the debtor as to what will happen much
later when the discharge hearing is held.
The Insolvency Act of 1976, which followed the Justice study by
one year, did not adopt these recommendations. Instead, it permits dis-
cretionary dispensation with the public examination upon application
by the Official Receiver.64 In the High Court few applications appear
under this statute, and public examinations remain the rule rather than
the exception. 5
C. The Status of Debtors Prior To and Following Discharge
The status of both undischarged and discharged bankrupts differs
greatly under the American and English systems. In the United States,
e1 JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 19. See also I.F. FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 113-14.
62 JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 21.
' See infra notes 104-35 and accompanying text.
Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60, § 6.
e For example, during 1979 there were 705 public examinations in the High Court and
only 30 orders dispensing with public examination. There was a much greater inclination to dis-
pense with the public examination in the county court. One thousand two hundred and eleven
orders were made dispensing with the examination while 2,972 examinations were held. LORD
CHANCELLOR'S DEPT., JUDICIAL STATISTICS: ENGLAND AND WALES, CMD. 7977 (1979) (Tables
C.3(b), (c).
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the debtor's postpetition earnings may not be taken by the trustee to
pay the claims of creditors participating in the bankruptcy proceed-
ings."6 Exactly the opposite is true in England and Wales: until the
discharge is granted, the trustee67 is entitled to reach the debtor's
postpetition earnings and apply them to the payment of her obliga-
tions.6" This rarely occurs, though, because most debtors earn only
enough to meet their daily living expenses. But the option to reach
postpetition earnings for the benefit of prepetition creditors remains a
possibility. Also, the bankrupt is usually urged during the public exam-
ination to make periodic payments to the Official Receiver until the
discharge is granted. Because it is virtually impossible for a debtor to
obtain an immediate and absolute discharge, bankruptcy in England is
an integral part of, not an alternative to, the debt collection process.
The harsh attitude toward discharge manifests itself in other ways:
an undischarged bankrupt cannot be elected to or sit or vote in either
House of Parliament;69 while undischarged, a debtor cannot be elected
to, or act as, a member of a local authority;70 nor may she hold a solici-
tor's practicing certificate;71 and, an undischarged bankrupt cannot act
as a corporate director or as a corporate manager without leave of the
court. 2 Moreover, the bankrupt's disqualification from holding public
office continues for an additional five years beyond discharge unless a
court orders otherwise.7 3 And finally, section 155 of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1914 declares guilty of a misdemeanor any undischarged bank-
rupt who
(a) either alone or jointly with any other person obtains credit to
the extent of fifty pounds or upwards from any person without
informing that person that he is an undischarged bankrupt; or (b)
engages in any trade or business under a name other than that
under which he was adjudicated bankrupt without disclosing to all
persons with whom he enters into any business transaction under
the name under which he was adjudicated bankrupt.74
e With a few exceptions, which do not include earnings, the trustee is only entitled to prop-
erty owned by the debtor at the date of petition. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. V 1981). Of course,
creditors holding nondischargeable claims are entitled to engage in postpetition collection activity.
6' If no trustee is appointed, the Official Receiver may appoint one.
,8 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, §§ 38(2)(a), 51.
6, Bankruptcy Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. ch. 52, § 32.
70 Local Government Act, 1972, ch. 70, § 80(1)(b).
71 Solicitors Act, 1974, ch. 47, §§ 12, 15.
72 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, §§ 187, 367.
73 The disqualifications continue for the five-year period unless the debtor receives a certifi-
cate of misfortune pursuant to Bankruptcy Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., ch. 52, § 32(2), or Local
Goverment Act, 1972, ch. 70, § 81(1)(b). In practice, few certificates of misfortune are granted.
WILLIAMS & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 133-34. Some modification of these disabilities has been
suggested. See CORK, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, 1838-1853.
7" Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 155, amended by Insolvency Act, 1976, ch.
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It is true that many of these disqualifications do not affect the lives
of most debtors: for instance, few members of Parliament will be in-
volved in bankruptcy proceedings." Still, the disqualifications do evi-
dence a generally held view that bankruptcy is a most serious matter.
This attitude is also displayed in the rules governing discharge.
D. Eligibility for Discharge
English discharge policy is somewhat more complicated than that
currently prevailing in the United States. An English court is not lim-
ited to granting or denying a discharge."8 The Bankruptcy Act of 1914
permits the discharge to be granted subject to a period of suspension, or
the court may
refuse the discharge; or. . . require the bankrupt as a condition of
his discharge to consent to judgment being entered against him by
the official receiver or trustee for any balance or part of any bal-
ance of the debts provable under the bankruptcy which is not satis-
fied at the date of the discharge, such balance or part of any bal-
ance of the debts to be paid out of the future earnings or after-
acquired property of the bankrupt in such manner and subject to
such condition as the court may direct; but execution shall not be
issued in the judgment without leave of court, which leave may be
given on proof that the bankrupt has since his discharge acquired
property or income available towards payment of his debts.
77
The statute confers on the court the power to refuse, condition, or sus-
pend the discharge without restriction and without guidance as to how
these powers are to be exercised."
Much in the fashion of the American statute, 9 the English act
lists a number of examples of debtor misconduct, referred to as "facts,"
which strongly influence courts in deciding whether, and what type of,
a discharge should be granted. The most commonly established facts
are:
(1) that the bankrupt's assets [do not equal at least fifty per-
cent of his unsecured liabilities unless he establishes that this situa-
tion] has arisen from circumstances for which he cannot justly be
held responsible.
60, § 1(1), sched. 1, pt. I.
7' For the discussion of one recent case involving a former member of Parliament see infra
text accompanying notes 129-32 (Hearing Number Five).
78 Cf 11 U.S.C. § 727 (Supp. V 1981) (American courts are so limited).
77 Bankruptcy Act of 1914, § 26, supra note 18.
79 See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
19 11 U.S.C. § 727 (Supp. V 1981).
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(2) That the bankrupt has omitted to keep such books of ac-
count as are usual and proper in the business carried on by him
and as sufficiently disclose his business transactions and financial
position within the three years immediately preceding his
bankruptcy ...
(3) That the bankrupt has continued to trade after knowing
himself to be insolvent ...
(4) That the bankrupt has failed to account satisfactorily for
any loss of assets or for any deficiency of assets to meet his
liabilities . ..
(5) That the bankrupt has brought on, or contributed to, his
bankruptcy by rash and hazardous speculations, or by unjustifiable
extravagance in living, or by gambling, or by culpable neglect of
his business affairs.80
In America, any findings of debtor misconduct or ineligibility for
discharge will lead to a denial of discharge. In England, the effect is
less clear-cut. Strictly speaking, the presence of statutory facts is rele-
vant only to the determination of whether the court will grant an abso-
lute order of discharge; if a statutory fact is found, denial, suspension,
or condition of the discharge become the court's only alternatives. But,
in reality, the presence of facts obviously influences the relief granted
by the court and is usually mentioned when the decision is an-
nounced.81 Some facts are regarded as being more serious than others.
For instance, the failure to keep proper books and continuing to trade
after knowledge of insolvency are regarded as especially serious facts.
82
The number and seriousness of the facts established assist the court in
determining the appropriate form of relief.
E. The Discharge Hearings
1. Application by the Debtor
The debtor may apply for a discharge at any time after the public
examination has been concluded." The court will hold a hearing on
this application after appropriate notice is given to creditors.84 At the
discharge hearing, the Official Receiver presents to the court a report
that includes an evaluation of the causes of the debtor's bankruptcy and
90 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 26(3).
81 They are also significant at the appellate level. See, e.g., In re Smith [1947] 1 All E.R.
769.
82 WILLIAMS & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 129-30.
83 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 26(1).
Although creditors may be heard at the hearing, they rarely attend. Ordinarily, the only
persons in attendance are the debtor, the Official Receiver, the judge (or a "registrar," see supra
note 31), court staff, and occasionally, a bankruptcy trustee.
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a report on whatever cooperation has been offered by the debtor, in-
cluding the marking of voluntary payments between the date of the
public examination and the date of the discharge hearing. This report
is very influential in shaping the court's attitude toward the debtor:
The Official Receiver's findings of fact, and his recommendations
based thereon, are. . . of foremost significance and generally carry
great influence, since they are made by an officer of the court.
Moreover the Act specifically provides that the report shall be
prima facie evidence of the statements it contains, and hence it is
incumbent upon the bankrupt to mount a successful challenge to
any adverse statements if they are not to stand to his
disadvantage.8 5
After the Official Receiver's report has been read, the debtor is
called to the witness stand and is placed under oath. The questioning
by the Official Receiver will focus on the debtor's activities since entry
of the receiving order and her present financial status. She may be
asked why she wishes a discharge. She will always be asked whether
she is willing to make payments out of future earnings for the benefit of
her creditors. If she promised at her public examination to make volun-
tary payments and did not in fact do so, she will be asked to explain
this default.
Most debtors behave in a very docile fashion at this hearing; they
are anxious to obtain a discharge and do not want to do anything that
will jeopardize their chances. Occasionally, a debtor will take issue
with the Official Receiver's characertization of her prebankruptcy con-
duct, arguing, for instance, that she did not engage in rash and hazard-
ous speculation. Such recalcitrance will be quickly stifled by a reference
to the transcript of the public examination. 6 The debtor will be re-
minded that she admitted the existence of statutory facts at that time.
Most of the evidence used against the debtor at the discharge hearing is
derived from, or obtained through, the debtor's answers at the public
examination.
Prior to the debtor's exit from the witness stand she will be asked
to make a specific offer for the benefit of her creditors. She may state
that she is unable to afford anything, or she may offer a specific sum
such as £5 per week for two years. The court will then ask the Official
Receiver for a reaction to this offer. The Official Receiver's position
concerning the adequacy of the offer is very significant but not disposi-"
tive. The court may approve the plan of payment suggested by the Offi-
88 I.F. FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 286 (footnote omitted).
88 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 119-22 (Hearing Number Three).
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cial Receiver, or may implement a different one. If the court is consid-
ering suspending the discharge, the Official Receiver will be consulted
as to the appropriate suspension period. Then, unless there is reason to
adjourn the hearing,"7 the court will immediately announce its decision.
2. Automatic Review and Automatic Discharge Under the
Insolvency Act of 1976
Debtors in England and Wales must often struggle to obtain their
discharges. Not surprisingly, therefore, many debtors simply fail to ap-
ply for discharge. This feature of the English bankruptcy system was
criticized as early as 1957,8 when it was suggested that bankrupts
should be granted an automatic discharge two years after the conclusion
of the public examination unless the court specifically found that an
automatic discharge was inappropriate. Almost twenty years after this
suggestion was made, the Insolvency Act of 1976 was enacted. It con-
tains a provision that empowers the bankruptcy court, either at the con-
clusion of the public examination or when it makes an order dispensing
with such examination, to grant the debtor an automatic discharge that
will become effective in five years.8 9 Since this authorization has only a
prospective effect, the Insolvency Act of 1976 also requires the Official
Receiver to bring forward for review cases of all prior undischarged
bankrupts after five years have elapsed.90
3. Dispositon of Cases
Unconditional discharges are a rarity. During 1979, the last year
for which statistics are available, only slightly more than four percent
of the bankrupts (29 of 666) received unconditional discharges. 91 The
automatic review process authorized by the Insolvency Act of 1976 pro-
duces a somewhat more favorable figure: Over one half of these dispo-
87 See, e.g., id.
" BOARD OF iRADE, BANKRUPTCY LAW AMENDMENT COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND DEEDS OF ARRANGEMENT LAW AMENDMENT, CMD. 221, at
20-21 (1957). See also JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 25-26 (failure of bankrupts to seek discharge is
"one of the most disquieting features of the present" English bankruptcy system).
88 Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60, § 7. This prospective grant of a discharge is without
prejudice to the debtor's right to apply for a discharge at an earlier date. The automatic discharge
will be granted only if there is no substantial debtor misconduct.
80 Id. § 8.
" The statistics for the period 1974-79 are as follows:
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sitions (1178 of 2263) resulted in an unconditional discharge. 2 There
are two reasons for the greater percentage of unconditional discharges
in this second category. First, the court has complete discretion to grant
an unconditional discharge in automatic review hearings even if statu-
tory facts are present.93 Second, five years have elapsed since the
debtor's bankruptcy adjudication, and the passage of time no doubt en-
courages clemency."" But the fact remains that over the years the vast
majority of all discharges are granted subject to conditions and/or a
period of suspension. 5 The unconditional discharge is the exception,
not the rule, in England and Wales.98
F. Effect of Discharge
The English bankruptcy process makes extensive use of techniques
of condition and suspension to carry out discharge policy. But the dis-
charge, when finally granted, is rather fully effective. It discharges the
debtor from all provable9 " prepetition claims, with three exceptions:
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Dispositions 722 787 799 724 773 666
Refused 78 82 113 80 102 108
Adjourned generally 25 15 12 18 14 11
Withdrawn 15 10 10 11 16 3
Unconditional discharge 15 12 10 22 38 29
Conditional discharge 155 176 209 168 227 210
Conditional suspended
discharge 233 232 201 222 229 153
Suspended 201 260 244 203 147 152
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE, BANKRUPTCY: GENERAL ANNUAL REPORTS (1974-79) (Table 7).
92 LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPT., JUDICIAL STATISTICS: ENGLAND AND WALES, CMD. 7977
(1979) (Table C.3(c)).
,4 Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60, § 8(6)(a).
A principle of self-selection may also be at work. Perhaps swindlers and intentional abus-
ers of the credit-granting process are impatient and apply for a discharge before the five years
have elapsed. Because the automatic review procedure applies only when there has been no prior
application for a discharge, id. § 8(1)(a), automatic discharges may involve less culpable conduct.
"4 Viewed realistically, an unconditional discharge granted under the automatic review pro-
cess is the same as a discharge granted subject to a five-year period of suspension. Thus, the
figures for unconditional discharge under the automatic review process overemphasize the leniency
of the process.
'" Another factor helps understate the restrictiveness of discharge policy when compared with
that prevailing in the United States. In this country, the bankruptcy discharge ordinarily will be
granted in the first few months of the bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. app.-Bankr. R.
404 (1976). And there are only a few situations in which property acquired by the debtor follow-
ing commencement of the proceedings will be taken in satisfaction of creditors' claims. See 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981). In England all of the debtor's postpetition assets are theoreti-
cally subject to seizure, see supra note 68 and accompanying text, and the debtor does not rou-
tinely receive a discharge in the early stages of the proceeding. Even the unconditional discharge is
not received until after a substantial period of time has passed. See supra text accompanying notes
43-46.
" Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 30. The concept of provable claims operates
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certain tax and penal obligations, liabilities incurred by means of fraud
or fraudulent breach of trust, and certain matrimonial debts.98
Generally, we can say that in both England and the United States,
exceptions from discharge exist to protect creditors with claims of spe-
cial merit9" against the possibility of abuse of the discharge privilege
and to take care of the occasional case in which the debtor fortuitously
acquires postpetition wealth.1"' If we truly believed that the debtor had
yielded up all her property and that there was no prospect of an im-
provement in her financial condition, there would be no exceptions to
discharge. But there is always a lingering doubt, the hope that the
debtor can do something for her creditors. This leads to the creation of
such exceptions. English discharge practice keeps the debtor waiting for
a long period of time, and does not authorize a release without an in-
tensive examination of the debtor's conduct and ability to pay, and fre-
quently conditions a discharge upon the debtor's consent to pay credi-
tors out of future income. This practice minimizes the chance that
creditors will be surprised and disappointed by developments in the
debtor's life following the granting of the discharge. Accordingly, it is
not surprising to find fewer exceptions to discharge in England than in
the United States.101
III. Six DISCHARGE HEARINGS
Any discharge decision by an English court involves the exercise of
an extraordinary amount of discretion, discretion that, for the most
to exclude certain creditors from any participation in the bankruptcy estate. Section 30(1) provides
a list of creditors who do not hold provable claims (e.g., an unliquidated negligence claim). Most
such creditors are excluded from participation because of difficulties associated with the establish-
ment of an exact amount for the claim. Because the discharge affects only provable debts (§ 28(2)),
creditors holding nonprovable claims must be added to the list of those whose collection rights
survive bankruptcy.
98 Id. § 28(1).
99 The status of the creditor (e.g., former spouse) or the circumstances under which the claim
was created (e.g., fraud) are both factors which may lead the legislature to create an exception to
discharge.
100 In the United States, only certain postpetition acquisitions of property can be claimed by
the trustee for the benefit of prepetition creditors and then only in the 180 days following the filing
of the petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981).
201 Compare id. § 523(a) (listing nine exceptions to discharge) with Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4
& 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 28(1) (listing only three exceptions).
A bankruptcy discharge with few, if any, exceptions, may be preferred for one reason that
has little to do with discharge policy. In bankruptcy proceedings, unsecured creditors are paid in
order of a statutory hierarchy of priorities. See Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 33;
11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (Supp. V 1981). The creditor with a nondischargeable claim has two chances
to collect: during the proceeding and following it. If successful, this creditor may eventually realize
a greater recovery than a creditor holding a dischargeable claim having a higher priority. Thus,
the provision of many exceptions to discharge can indirectly undercut the distribution priority
established elsewhere in the statute.
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part, traditonally has not been granted to American bankruptcy
judges." 2
Because the discretion held by English bankruptcy judges is so
broad, this part of the Article provides, so far as is possible, a detailed
look at how the discretion actually is used, and should raise questions
relating to how American judges and society would view such plenary
authority if American law were restructured. 0 3 It is possible to state,
but only in the most general terms, the principles that control the exer-
cise of this discretion:
The Act itself lays down no explicit guidelines to indicate
what are the objectives to be achieved through the court's con-
trolled use of its discretionary powers in relation to discharge from
bankruptcy. However, it may be logically inferred from the overall
purposes attaching to the bankruptcy law that the court should be
mindful of such questions as the debtor's suitability to recommence
trading; whether the creditors have been enabled to recover all that
might reasonably be made forthcoming to them through the bank-
ruptcy; and the essential consideration of the proper protection of
the public. Against such considerations must be balanced the need
to avoid placing such a lingering burden upon the debtor as to
destroy all motive for future exertion on his part, for it is a funda-
mental policy of the bankruptcy law that, in return for giving up
his property, the debtor shall be made a free man again. Likewise
it would be regarded as unfair to accompany a refusal of discharge
with a formulation of conditions as to the future payment of money
to so great an amount that there is no reasonable chance that the
bankrupt will ever qualify for his discharge.'
The sole power to determine debtor eligibility for discharge has
resided with the court since 1883. Prior to that time it had been held by
creditors alone10 5 or shared with the court.108 The Bankruptcy Act of
1883107 gave the court complete control over the discharge because
creditors had improperly exercised their power to regulate the grant of
discharge.108 By the beginning of the twentieth century, it was quite
clear that appellate courts would intervene only in cases of extraordi-
102 See supra text preceding note 9. See infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
103 See infra text accompanying notes 166-231.
104 I.F. FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 289-90 (footnotes omitted).
105 An Act to prevent the committing of frauds by Bankrupts, 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 10 (1732).
10" An Act to consolidate and amend the Law of Bankruptcy, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 71, § 48
(1869).
'07 An Act to amend and consolidate the Law of Bankruptcy, 46 & 47 Vict., ch. 52, § 28
(1883).
'- See S.W. DUNSCOMB, Bankruptcy, A Study in Comparative Legislation, in 2 STUDIES IN
HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 150 (1893).
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nary abuse of this discretion.109 The last reported challenge to the dis-
cretionary exercise of the discharge power occurred thirty-five years
ago."O The issue before the Court of Appeal at that time was whether
an excessively long period of suspension had been imposed. The action
of the trial court was approved, and the standard of appellate review
articulated by Lord Green made reversal of trial courts difficult:
Counsel for the bankrupt urged that the length of the suspen-
sion is unconscionably severe, because it would result in 10 years
elapsing between the adjudication and the final discharge ....
No rule as to length of period, for the purpose of judging its sever-
ity, can, I think, be laid down so as to be applicable to every class
of case. One has to look at the whole circumstances of the bank-
ruptcy and see whether the date to which the discharge of the
bankrupt is ultimately remitted is excessively remote. There, again,
I think it is a question of discretion, subject to this, that the court
will always interfere where it comes to the conclusion that the dis-
cretion has been unconscionably exercised in the matter of the
length of the suspension. . . . Every case has to be decided on its
merits. Whether or not I personally should have imposed such a
long period is neither here nor there. It is sufficient for me to say
that the period which the registrar throught fit is not one that, in
my opinion, is so unconscionable as to justify us in interfering with
his discretion.1 '
Little is generally known about how the trial court decides what
condition and/or period of suspension is appropriate. Appellate deci-
sions are few in number and, as in the opinion just quoted, are usually
confined to an approval in the most general terms of the lower court's
ruling. Furthermore, there is no bankruptcy service in England that
reports decisions at the trial level. One recent and particularly notori-
ous bankruptcy adjudication, however, provides a rare and interesting
insight into the English decisionmaking process. On June 21, 1977,
Mr. Registrar Hunt granted a discharge to one William Jack Godfrey,
a property developer and spare-time pig farmer with debts of approxi-
mately £27,000,000. This discharge was subject to a period of suspen-
sion of five months and a condition of payment of £2000 in two annual
installments of £1000. The judge's remarks were so extensive that they
'" In re Shaw, [1917] 2 K.B. 734 (suspension of discharge for period of two years held
proper exercise of discretion); In re Chase, 3 Morrell Bankr. Cas. 228 (1886) (three-month sus-
pension a proper exercise of discretion). The fact that appellate courts would give the bankruptcy
judge a free hand was anticipated by one critic who feared that the debtor's treatment would be
too lenient. The Government Proposals as to the Discharge of Bankrupts, 27 SOLIC. J. 443
(1883).
110 In re Smith, [1947] 1 All E.R. 769.
"I Id. at 771.
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were reproduced in the August 1977 issue of The Banker'12 and de-
serve repetition here. Note that even this elaboration, which the maga-
zine's editors regarded as "a rare insight,"' 3 provides little information
as to how Mr. Registrar Hunt determined the appropriate condition
and period of suspension. We are left with the questions why the pe-
riod of suspension was only five months and why Mr. Registrar Hunt
imposed a condition of repayment in the amount of £2000 instead of
some other sum:
The vast size of the deficiency makes it desirable to state the
principles on which the court acts in granting or refusing a dis-
charge. For if the size of the failure is a crucial factor the conclu-
sion would seem to be that a debtor with a deficiency of this mag-
nitude would never get a discharge at all. So what are the
principles?
I think the starting point is to be found in a judgment of Mr.
Vaughan Williams, a leading authority on the subject, when he
said: "The over-riding intention of the legislation in all bankruptcy
acts is that the debtor on giving up the whole of his property shall
be a free man again, able to earn his livelihood and having the
ordinary inducement to industry. Sometimes it is not right that the
bankrupt should be free immediately, he must pass through a pe-
riod of probation; and theoretically there may be cases where he
ought not to be free at all; but prima facie he is to give up every-
thing he has and in doing that he is to be made a free man."
Now what is the position of the bankrupt in this case? If I
thought there was any tangible expectation of his receiving a larger
income than that which is necessary for his support in his position
in life I should see the propriety of suspending his discharge for a
longer period or even of setting aside some portion of his income.
As to the circumstances which may affect the application of
this principle, the Bankruptcy Act lists a number of facts . . . the
existence of which precludes the court from granting an uncondi-
tional discharge. ...
It is, however, significant that the legislation does not provide
that the court should take into account the absolute size of the defi-
ciency. This does not, in my judgment, mean that the size of the
deficiency is wholly immaterial. . . .[W]hen there is a very large
deficiency, I think the court should subject the causes of failure to
particularly careful scrutiny, before discharging the debtor, in or-
der to satisfy itself that his conduct has not been open to serious
criticism.
As it appears from the judgment I quoted, in considering
122 127 THE BANKER (LONDON) NO. 618, at 139-40 (AUG. 1977).
113 Id. at 139.
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whether, and if so on what terms, to discharge a bankrupt, two
main questions usually arise.
1. Whether the conduct of the bankrupt has been such that
the public ought to be protected against his further operations for a
period of time, or even permanently, and
2. whether he is likely to be able to make some financial
contribution towards his debts.
In dealing with the first question, it may often be felt that the
mere fact of having undergone the somewhat traumatic experience
of bankruptcy is itself a sufficiently sharp lesson to ensure that the
individual will be more careful in future. On the other hand it may
be that to prolong the disability by a period of suspension is desira-
ble to reinforce the lesson, and to draw some distinction between
more and less serious cases.
As regards the question of contribution, it will often be the
case that the deficiency is so large that no contribution which it
would be reasonable to expect will have any material impact for
the creditors. But this does not mean that no contribution should
be required from a bankrupt who is in a position to make one.
Bankruptcy is not intended to be a soft option, and a genuine at-
tempt to do what one can to repair the damage is likely to inspire
greater confidence that the debtor will behave responsibly in the
future. ...
[The Registrar at this point referred to events leading up to
the bankruptcy of Mr. Godfrey, the money his companies bor-
rowed, the personal guarantees he gave on behalf of the companies
and the collapse of the property market.]
Now I think there are a number of comments to made about
this. First, it must be said that if the bankrupt was at fault in
misjudging the future course of the property market, he was in
good company. A great many other people made the same misjudg-
ment, including, be it noted, his main creditors. He did not raise
funds he needed from innocent members of the public, who relied
on his judgment, but from professionals who were just as well
qualified as the bankrupt to judge the soundness of his schemes. If,
with all their resources of expertise, they were prepared to advance
the funds for the bankrupt's operations, I do not think they can be
heard to say that they relied entirely on his judgment. Nor in fact
has any of them, so far as I am aware, suggested otherwise.
Secondly I note that none of these creditors has come forward
to complain of the bankrupt's conduct. If they had come and com-
plained that he had misled them about material factors, the posi-
tion might be very different. And, bearing in mind the very large
losses which some of them seen not unlikely to incur, I think it is
of some significance that none has come forward to complain.
It is also worth noting that the receiver was happy to employ
19821
94 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the bankrupt to manage the companies' affairs, so that he was pre-
sumably satisfied with his competence, and there has been no criti-
cism from the receiver of the state of the companies' books and
records when he took over.
It follows, in my judgment, that the failure of these compa-
nies, which is the cause of the bankruptcy, cannot be said to be due
to any culpable mismanagement or misconduct by the bankrupt.
This is not, of course, to suggest that he is entitled to a certificate
of misfortune. He chose to embark on very large-scale operations,
involving inevitable risks and to incur personal liability by giving
guarantees, which he could not hope to meet; and to that extent he
is the author of his own downfall. But I accept his claim that the
financial institutions whose debts he guaranteed could not realisti-
cally have believed that he could pay them. I have no doubt that
they asked for the guarantees simply in order to ensure that the
debtor was fully committed himself, and therefore unlikely to play
ducks and drakes with the companies' fortunes.
[The Registrar here referred to the debtor's farming opera-
tions which resulted in a 'substantial deficiency.'] But the fact is
that it was started more as a hobby than as his main business, and
until the disaster in the property business he could well afford to
take the losses in the farm, and creditors were in no real danger."1
The paucity of available information concerning how the bank-
ruptcy discharge process functions in England will frustrate anyone
used to the avalanche of information on bankruptcy topics in the
United States. At the same time, the situation in England is quite
understandable. As the preceding example demonstrates, judicial com-
ments of much substance are rare. There is no substantial demand for
information about the way in which appropriate conditions and periods
of suspension are determined. Lawyers and accountants would be the
principal consumers of such information. Because debtors are not usu-
ally represented by solicitors or barristers at the time they seek a dis-
charge, there is little demand for such information. Accordingly, attend-
ance at a number of discharge hearings is the only practical way for an
outsider to acquire any understanding of how the discharge process op-
erates. The six cases which follow are not representative of what one
might observe by attending bankruptcy court on any particular day.
Indeed, one case involves a very unusual set of facts. But they do illus-
trate how the bankruptcy system actually functions. 15
114 Id. at 139-40.
118 These cases are based on notes taken when I attended discharge hearings at County
Court in Croydon, England and Cardiff, Wales, and at the High Court in London, between Feb.
1 and July 15, 1980.
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A. Hearing Number One: The Repeater
This is the third bankruptcy for the debtor. Twice before, once in
the early 1960's and then a decade later, he has received a discharge.
Now in his late fifties, he is once again asking the court for relief. He
stands in the witness box and is examined under oath by the Official
Receiver. His testimony reveals that he is a free-lance technical consult-
ant earning about £1500 per year. He states that he believes that he
can immediately double his income if he is given a discharge. (In Eng-
land, the stigma of bankruptcy is far greater than it is in the United
States and the lack of discharge can be a serious impediment to profes-
sional advancement.) The court and the Official Receiver accept his
characterization of the situation. In response to a question put by the
Official Receiver, he admits that his creditors will receive less than a
ten percent dividend unless further assets are made available. The Offi-
cial Receiver wants to know whether the debtor is willing to make fur-
ther payments as a condition of obtaining his discharge. The answer is
yes. One thousand pounds to be paid out of future income over a two-
year period would be a manageable sum. Not satisfied with this
amount, the Official Receiver asks whether it could be raised to £2000.
Before the debtor can respond, the court intervenes. What about £5000
over a longer period of time? The debtor says he can manage this sum
and the Official Receiver indicates satisfaction with the larger amount.
The court then grants the discharge subject to the condition that the
debtor (who has no dependents) pay £5000 in five annual installments
of £1000.
Comment: This is an interesting case for several reasons. It illus-
trates the stigma that may be felt by those persons who are undis-
charged bankrupts. Here the debtor was able to convince the court that
his status was impeding his professional advancement. The court ac-
cepted this contention but then took an active role in the process of
determining how much the debtor could pay for the privilege of ob-
taining his discharge. It is unclear how the court arrived at the sum of
£5000. Neither the Official Receiver nor the debtor offered any fact
that the court used to justify its award. A decision can be made in this
fashion only if the bankruptcy system allows the trial court almost com-
plete freedom to fix the terms of a conditional discharge or to determine
the appropriate length of a suspension."e
116 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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B. Hearing Number Two: A Suspended Discharge
This is the second bankruptcy for the debtor, a man approxi-
mately forty years old. The first proceeding was commenced in 1965
with a discharge being received in 1969. This one was commenced in
1974. Debts (originally understated by a third) amount to £22,000 and
assets amount to only fifty-five pounds. No voluntary payments have
been made by the debtor during the past six years. He has a weekly
take-home pay of seventy-four pounds and must support a wife and
two teenaged children. He can make no offer of future payments for
the benefit of his creditors. The court then asks whether the debtor's
relatives can make any payments. Again, the answer is no. Despite the
fact that creditors have not received anything, the court grants a dis-
charge subject to a period of suspension of one year but without any
conditions. Two reasons are given by the court to justify the period of
suspension. First, this is the debtor's second bankruptcy. Second, prior
to the bankruptcy, the debtor had sold some property that was subject
to a security interest without the secured party's consent and had failed
to turn the proceeds over to the secured creditor.
Comment: The court was obviously convinced that there was no
practical way for the debtor to produce any more money, so the court
was simply concerned with expressing disapproval of the debtor's re-
peat appearance in bankruptcy court and his prebankruptcy conversion
of the collateral. At first glance, the one-year suspension seems rather
moderate under the circumstances. Presumably the court was taking
into account the fact that the debtor had already been an undischarged
bankrupt for six years at the time of the hearing.
An American bankruptcy judge is given different tools to deal with
the problem of repeated bankruptcies and prebankruptcy conversion of
collateral. A repeater is not entitled to more than one discharge in liq-
uidation proceedings every six years,117 but a judge would not be enti-
tled to deny a discharge for prebankruptcy conversion of collateral, al-
though it is possible that this transaction might create a
nondischargeable obligation."1 ' The American bankruptcy judge also
117 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981). The six-year rule is not applicable if the debtor
files a voluntary petition under Chapter 13. Id. § 1328(a), (b). However, the frequency of use of
Chapter 13 will be considered by the court when it determines whether the Chapter 13 plan has
been filed in good faith.
a 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (Supp. V 1981). See In re Auvenshine, 9 Bankr. 772 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1981) (sale of appliances subject to security interest is "willful and malicious" within
the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and therefore debt is non-dischargeable). But see In re
Holdges, 4 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980) (sale of stereo subject to security interest, al-
though "willful," was not "malicious" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) where sale
was not intended to harm creditor, and debtor intended eventually to pay creditor if he was able,
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has no power to suspend a discharge for the purpose of expressing dis-
approval of the debtor's conduct.
C. Hearing Number Three: "Unjustifiable Extravagance in Living"
The debtor, male and slightly over thirty, is seeking a discharge
from personal debts amounting to nearly £12,000 even though no dis-
tribution has been made to his creditors. The twelve pounds in assets
which he turned over to the Official Receiver has been used to pay
administrative expenses. Today the debtor is making £300 per month
and his wife makes £389 a month. They have no children, but he testi-
fies that they hope to start a family in the near future. His wife owns
the house and makes the monthly mortgage payments of £174. They
have no other debts, nor do they have any other substantial assets, not
even a car. The court is also informed by the Official Receiver that,
concurrent with the debtor's bankruptcy, a company controlled by the
debtor became involved in insolvency proceedings. There are corporate
creditors with £16,000 in unpaid claims. The Official Receiver further
states that one of the precipitating causes of bankruptcy was "unjustifi-
able extravagance in living." This is one of the statutory facts whose
presence prevents the court from granting an unconditional dis-
charge."" The debtor, from the witness box, questions the accuracy of
this statement. He is reminded by the Official Receiver that, on his
public examination, he admitted that he had been guilty of unjustifiable
extravagance in living. To refresh his recollection, the Official Receiver
reads from the official transcript of that proceeding. 120 The debtor im-
mediately acquiesces in the conclusion of the Official Receiver, who
then informs the court that he believes payment in the area of £4500 to
£5000 should be required as a condition of discharge. The bankrupt
responds with an offer of fifty pounds a month for three years (a total
of £1800). He points out that the family monthly living expenses are
£355 and when the £174 mortgage payment is subtracted only £160 of
joint income remains uncommitted. The fifty-pound proposed monthly
payment will have to come out of this joint uncommitted income. He
reiterates his and his wife's hope to start a family. The court is not
impressed with the offer. The judge is concerned that there are almost
£28,000 in unpaid debts if one combines the personal and business
bankruptcies. The debtor is told that he will have to do more. £1800
and therefore discharge may be granted).
11 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 26(3)(0. See supra notes 76-82 and
accompanying text.
120 See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
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over a three-year period is not enough. The court adjourns the hearing
for three months. The debtor is warned that he must come up with
something in the area of £5000. If he does not, the application will be
denied. The three-month adjournment will give the debtor a chance to
reconsider his offer.
Comment: Time and again, the bankrupt's admissions during the
public examination come back to haunt him. Even without such admis-
sions, the Official Receiver's report, which includes a determination of
what statutory facts are present in the case, is prima facie evidence of
these facts.121 But the bankrupt's admissions during the public exami-
nation make the Official Receiver's position incontestable. To an ob-
server, this may be the most troubling part of the whole discharge pro-
cess. Debtors generally seem to have no idea that the admissions they
make during the public examination will later be used against them at
the discharge hearing. In this case, the presence of "unjustifiable ex-
travagance in living" obviously was a significant factor in the tough
stand taken by the court. If the three-month adjournment does not
cause the debtor to change his mind, it is clear that the discharge will
be denied. The unsuccessful debtor may apply at a later date for a
rehearing. 2 ' Presumably, unless the passage of time has softened the
court's heart, the reapplication will not be successful unless the debtor
is prepared to make a substantial payment for the benefit of his
creditors.
D. Hearing Number Four: Discharge and the Collection Process
The male debtor, about forty-seven years of age, was adjudicated a
bankrupt in August of 1978 with debts exceeding £2500. The Official
Receiver states that the debtor has not fully cooperated in the adminis-
tration of the estate. He has withheld information on certain business
ventures in which he was a partner and has sold property belonging to
the estate following the date of the petition. The Official Receiver
claims that the debtor failed to keep adequate books, contracted debts
without a reasonable expectation of repayment, and was guilty of cul-
pable neglect of his business affairs.12 ' The Official Receiver also re-
ports that £1600 has been given to him by a third party. This sum was
to be used to attempt a rescission.2. of the receiving order 25 which, for
some inexplicable reason, never took place.
... Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 26(6).
122 Id. § 108(1).
123 These are all statutory facts. Id. § 26(3).
124 Id. § 108(1).
125 See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
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Under examination by the Official Receiver, the debtor states that
he is a "rag and bone man."12 His income fluctuates sharply from
week to week but he estimates that it averages about forty pounds per
week. His answers concerning this income are rather vague and he
finally admits that he is still not keeping adequate books of account. He
has a wife and two children, ages eight and eleven. Although separated
from his wife, he tries to provide his family with £60 per week. The
Official Receiver asks him whether he is prepared to add anything to
the £1600 that has already been paid into court by a third party. His
response is, "I'll do whatever I have to do."
An examination by the attorney for one creditor, a rather unusual
occurrence, follows: "How can you afford to give your wife sixty
pounds per week when you only earn forty pounds?" The debtor then
admits that he has an additional business of rehabilitating old cars with
an unnamed partner. This business provides extra income but his testi-
mony on the extent of the income is rather vague. He finally tells the
attorney for the creditor that he would be willing to contribute ten
pounds per week. The Official Receiver expresses doubt that the debtor
can handle this additional payment but the court appears willing to
accept it, noting that the debtor can always ask for modification of a
conditional discharge decree after two years if he encounters unantici-
pated difficulty in making the payments.
127
The court and counsel for the creditor then engage in a discussion
of what should be done. They both obviously are of two minds. The
debtor has been quite uncooperative and evasive in his testimony. On
the other hand, the lump-sum payment of £1600, and the possibility of
an additional £500 in 10 weekly installments paid over the next year,
promise to yield substantial dividends to creditors. If the discharge is
denied the eventual net recovery to creditors will be less than this
amount. The creditor's attorney finally indicates that he would be satis-
fied with a conditional discharge calling for total payments to creditors
of £2100. The court agrees and enters an order to this effect.
Comment: There is nothing in the statute that authorizes the de-
posit of funds by a third party for the debtor's benefit, but neither is
there anything that prohibits it. Indeed, such deposits are quite com-
mon. They often come from relatives or employers who are anxious to
help the debtor. In the United States, this debtor would probably not
receive a discharge: His wrongful conduct prior to and during the
"26 A "rag and bone man" is a rag peddler. CF Morris Plan Indus. Bank of N.Y. v. Dreher,
144 F.2d 60, 61 (2d Cir. 1944) (itinerant "peddler of rags and old clothes" need not have
maintained financial records in order to obtain a discharge).
221 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 26(2).
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bankruptcy proceedings appears to establish several grounds for denial
of discharge.128 In England, however, his transgressions are not so
damaging because he can make payments to creditors out of future in-
come. If the creditor had objected to the discharge, it is unlikely that it
would have been granted. But the deposit of £1600 would then have to
have been returned to the depositor. This case most clearly demon-
strates the primary orientation of the English bankruptcy system to-
ward debt collection. Wrongful activity will not prevent the debtor from
obtaining a discharge if he can pay for it, and protection of the public
interest and condemnation of the debtor's uncooperative attitude are
values subordinated to the creditors' pecuniary interests.
E. Hearing Number Five: The Parliamentary Bankrupt
Ordinarily, there are very few spectators in bankruptcy court. But
the press is out in force on Friday, the thirteenth of June, 1980, to
observe the discharge hearing for John Stonehouse, a former Labor
M.P. and cabinet minister, who was adjudicated a bankrupt in Decem-
ber of 1976. In the early 1970's Mr. Stonehouse contracted debts of
more than £800,000. After his business ventures collapsed, he fled
England and went to the United States, where he attempted to fake a
death-by-drowning off a Florida beach. Then, using fraudulently ob-
tained passports," 9 he left this country. The authorities were not fooled
and he was eventually apprehended in Australia. After his return to
England he was sentenced to a seven-year jail term for theft. Released
after undergoing open-heart surgery and obviously in poor health, Mr.
Stonehouse is permitted to sit in the witness box during the course of
his examination. The Official Receiver reports the presence of five stat-
utory facts in this bankruptcy. It obviously is a very serious case and,
because of the debtor's prior parliamentary position, a most sensitive
one. The Official Receiver further reports that most of Mr. Stone-
house's assets were taken to satisfy the claims of secured creditors and
little remains for those that are unsecured. The Inland Revenue Ser-
vice, which has a first priority claim, has not been paid in full.
The debtor testifies that his sole income is a parliamentary pension
of fifty-eight pounds. His weekly expenses are fifty-six pounds. He is
not able to work but does engage in some charitable activity. He wants
a discharge because being an undischarged bankrupt involves a lot of
stress, which is bad for his heart.
128 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(B), (a)(3), (a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(D) (Supp. V 1981).
129 Cf F. FORSYTH, THE DAY OF THE JACKAL 61-63 (1971). A helpful chronology of events
is found in The Times (London), Aug. 7, 1976, at 2, col. 1.
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Another unusual aspect of this case is the fact that Mr. Stonehouse
is represented by counsel. His barrister urges a discharge for his client
on grounds of health and pleads for an exercise of the court's discretion
in a compassionate manner.
The Official Receiver does not oppose the application, informing
the court that the debtor's heart condition probably makes it a worth-
less exercise to grant a conditional discharge. The court then questions
the Official Receiver to make sure that he does not think that the dis-
charge should be refused. The answer is no. After noting that no credi-
tor has appeared in opposition to this application, the court grants a
discharge subject to a nine-month period of suspension because of the
seriousness of the bankruptcy. But there is no point in further punish-
ment. As the court observes, the debtor is "a broken reed."
Mr. Stonehouse exits from the witness stand, stumbling and al-
most falling in his rush to leave the courtroom. He is driven away from
the Law Courts in a Rolls-Royce and the Evening Standard30 head-
lines its account of the proceeding: "Stonehouse, debts and a Rolls-
Royce." But as the Times1 ' notes, the Rolls-Royce belongs to his solic-
itor, not to Mr. Stonehouse.
Comment: This is a striking example of how compassionate the
operation of the English bankruptcy system can be. It is highly unlikely
that an American bankruptcy judge would have been able to give Mr.
Stonehouse a discharge.1 "2 The nine-month period of suspension is a
rather moderate rebuke considering the magnitude of the bankruptcy
and the prominent public position of the debtor. But in both this and
the immediately preceding case a discharge is granted, despite the obvi-
ous debtor misconduct, when it appears that withholding it will not
produce any more assets for distribution to creditors.
F. Hearing Number Six: Automatic Review and an Unconditional
Discharge
The debtor, age seventy-four, has appeared at an automatic dis-
charge hearing held in accordance with the requirements of the Insol-
vency Act of 1976.33 The Official Receiver reports that there are
£1300 in debts and assets amounting to £174. In addition, the bank-
ruptcy trustee has been able to recover £500 the debtor had transferred
to his daughter prior to bankruptcy.""' A substantial dividend can be
1SO The Evening Standard (London), June 13, 1980, at 5, col. 2.
131 The Times (London), June 14, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
232 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A), (a)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
" Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60, § 7; see supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
134 See Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 42(1).
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paid, although not enough to pay creditors 50 pence on the pound.1 5
The Official Receiver also reports that the largest debt in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding was an obligation of a third person for which the
debtor was held vicariously responsible. This is clearly not a serious
bankruptcy. It is also apparent that, at his age, the debtor will not be
able to make further payments for the benefit of his creditors. No credi-
tors have appeared to oppose the discharge; therefore, the court grants
an immediate and unconditional release.
Comment: Although this is an uncomplicated case, it should be
noted that the debtor has had to wait five years for the grant of the
unconditional discharge. The absence of debtor misconduct, the sub-
stantial dividend paid to creditors, and the lack of future earning capac-
ity all combined to convince the court that this is a case in which there
should be no conditions upon the discharge and no period of
suspension.
G. Conclusions
Two general observations need to be made about these six cases
and, indeed, about the whole process of discharging bankrupts in Eng-
land. First of all, the suspended and conditional discharge system is
expensive to operate. Each case demands more attention than the dis-
charge of an American debtor because the process must respond to the
facts of the individual case. In the United States the debtor automati-
cally receives a discharge unless one of the limitation rules applies. Ad-
ditionally, in the vast majority of cases, parties who would like to see
the discharge denied can make their own determination without invok-
ing the judicial process to determine whether the debtor is eligible for
relief. The limitation rules are simple to apply (for example, the six-
year rule) and judicial participation in the discharge process is held to a
minimum. Careful judicial scrutiny of the facts is required only in un-
usual cases. In contrast, discharge hearings in England require much
more attention. It will be a rare case in which one of the statutory facts
is not present. Thus, the court often is obliged to determine an appro-
priate period of suspension and/or condition of payment. Most hear-
ings require an evaluation of the debtor's conduct and financial condi-
tion. The court does not develop these facts independently, so it must
rely heavily on the work of the Official Receiver.
This brings us to the second observation. The Official Receiver
stands at the center of the discharge process, gathering information
135 This is one of the statutory facts. Id. § 26(3)(a).
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about the debtor's conduct prior to the public examination, at the pub-
lic examination, and at the discharge hearing. The Receiver's highly
influential report and presentation during the discharge hearing are of
critical importance. Together the court and the Official Receiver share
the responsibility for determining what the debtor can afford to pay,
how the public interest is to be served, and what degree of firmness is
compatible with a basic sense of humanity. Reconciliation of these com-
peting demands is a difficult task and a critical component of the cur-
rent process. It would be possible to have a conditional/suspended dis-
charge system without an Official Receiver-but it would not be the
same system.
English bankruptcy procedure stands on a footing far different
from that in the United States. In England bankruptcy law exists in
part to promote debt collection, and the adjudicative system that devel-
oped around this function focuses on the debtor's particular circum-
stances and ability to pay. In the United States, on the other hand,
debtor rehabilitation is a paramount concern, and the use of limited
discharge facilitates a bankrupt's prompt return to the credit market.
The next part of the Article explores why and how two bankruptcy
systems with a shared heritage today exhibit such widely divergent ap-
proaches to discharge practice.
IV. NINETEENTH CENTURY CHANGES IN DISCHARGE POLICY
The rules relating to debtor discharge in England and the United
States were quite similar at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
The statutes of both countries contained conditional discharge provi-
sions. According to the American Bankruptcy Act of 1800,1"6 no dis-
charge could be granted except upon the consent of two-thirds in num-
ber and amount of creditors holding claims amounting to at least fifty
dollars. This provision was obviously patterned on the then-existing
English requirement that no discharge issue except on the consent of
four-fifths of all creditors holding claims no smaller than fifty
pounds. 317 Thus, in neither country would a discharge issue unless the
debtor was able to strike a satisfactory bargain with her creditors.
By the end of the century the situation had changed radically.
1S Ch.19, § 36, 2 Stat. 19, 31, § 36 (1800), repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat.
248. A more demanding requirement of 75% payment was required for those involved in a second
proceeding. Id. § 57.
" An act to prevent the committing of frauds by bankrupts, 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, § 10 (1732).
In 1776 the rigor of this rule was tempered. After the passage of one year, a debtor not able to
obtain the requisite creditor consents could still petition the lord chancellor, the lord keeper, or the
lords commissioners for a discharge. An act for the relief of insolvent debtors; and for the relief of
bankrupts, in certain cases, 16 Geo. 3, ch. 38, § 69 (1776).
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America,""8 but not England, had substituted a limited discharge for
the conditional, creditor-consent rule, and in so doing rejected the no-
tion that the discharge was in any way linked to payments that had
been made or might be made to creditors. England made no such radi-
cal change. Debtors still had to bargain for their discharge, although
the ultimate authority to grant them the desired relief had passed from
creditors to a bankruptcy official.1" 9
The creditor-consent provisions disappeared from both statutes
because experience had demonstrated that they were subject to abuse.
Creditors might arbitrarily withhold their consent even when it was
obvious that no further payments could be made for their benefit.140
Tough bargainers with decisive votes could obtain preferential treat-
ment."" A few creditors were often able to manipulate administration
of the estate for their own special advantage.1" Debtors also abused the
creditor-consent rule by arranging for the filing of fictitious claims
which diluted the voting power of legitimate creditor interests.1 " In
addition, toward the close of the century there was some recognition
that the public also had an interest in the satisfactory resolution of
debtor-creditor controversies and that this interest was not adequately
protected by the creditor-consent rules.""'
All these objections supported a transfer of the discharge-granting
authority from private parties to public officials, which is exactly what
happened in both countries. But they do not explain why the United
States took the additional step of substituting a limited discharge rule
for the previously existing conditional discharge practice. This was a
radical change in the bankruptcy discharge process that departed from
the practice in England, previous bankruptcy practice in the United
States,14 5 and the practice under state insolvency laws that were in
force during the time there was no federal bankruptcy legislation. 1 4 It
1" Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. 544, 550; see 11 U.S.C. § 727 (Supp. V
1981) (current version of § 14).
13' An act to amend and consolidate the Law of Bankruptcy, 46 & 47 Vict., ch. 52, § 28
(1883).
140 See 195 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 147 (1869) (remarks of Mr. Jessel); 65 id. (2d ser.) at 1088
(1842) (remarks of Sir J. Graham); Welbourne, Bankruptcy Before the Era of Victorian Reform,
4 CAMB. HIST. J. 51, 54 (1932).
141 See 30 CONG. REc., pt. 1, at 603 (1898) (remarks of Sen. Lindsay); S.W. DUNSCOMB,
supra note 108, at 150; F.R. NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITU.
TION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 153 (1918).
"42 CORK, FINAL REPORT, supra note 40, 48.
143 Welbourne, supra note 140, at 55..
1" See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
145 Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (repealed 1878); Bankruptcy
Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 4, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (repealed 1843); Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat.
19 (repealed 1803).
1' Many state statutes contained creditor-consent features. See P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND
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marked the beginning of the modern era in American bankruptcy law
during which the debtor has been able to obtain a discharge without
any consideration of her ability to make further payments to creditors.
There is no single fact or event that explains why the United States
made such a radical change in its discharge laws. Instead, several fac-
tors, including federalism, the expanding western frontier, and the de-
velopment of adequate alternative debt collection devices under state
law, combined to produce this result. To understand fully the impact of
these factors, however, we first need to consider the origins of British
bankruptcy law.
In England bankruptcy law began as collection law and continues
today to be so regarded. The first bankruptcy act, appearing in 1542
during the reign of Henry VIII, recited that:
[D]ivers and sundry persons craftily obtaining into their
hands great substance of other mens goods, do suddenly flee to
parts unknown, or keep their houses, not minding to pay or restore
to any their creditors, their debts and duties, but at their own wills
and pleasures consume the substance obtained by credit of other
men, for their own pleasure and delicate living, against all reason,
equity and good conscience .... 117
This statute did not contain any discharge provision and none ap-
peared in English bankruptcy law for the next 163 years. Even then,
the addition of the first discharge provision in 1705148 did not represent
a change in the fundamental direction of bankruptcy law. The new
provision was not designed to prevent collection activity but to facilitate
it:
In the early eighteenth century, the harshness with which
bankrupts were treated was greatly reduced by statutes which, for
the first time, granted them privileges. The change has been attrib-
uted to a novel recognition that bankrupts were not always delin-
quent and that those who failed because of circumstances beyond
their control deserve compassion and relief. Such sentiments were
certainly common in the literature of their time. However, parlia-
ment had acknowledged the existence of unfortunate bankrupts in
James I's reign without feeling concerned to give them concessions
... . When introduced to parliament, in response to the notorious
CREDITORS IN AMERICA 51, 72, 84-85, 123 (1974). Such discharge rules are conditional because
they grant discretion to the debtor's creditors to permit or deny the discharge. See supra note 17
and accompanying text.
14' An Act against such persons as do make bankrupts, 34 & 35 Henry 8, ch. 4, § 1 (1542-
43).
148 An Act to prevent Frauds frequently committed by Bankrupts, 4 & 5 Anne, ch. 17
(1705).
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frauds of Thomas Pitkyn in 1704, [the new bankruptcy statute]
was intended simply to increase the penalties for dishonesty, but
several M.P.s, influenced by the heavy losses recently sustained by
traders as a result of French wars and storms, proposed additional
clauses for the relief of honest bankrupts. These were adopted be-
cause of the conviction, previously hinted at in the 1624 act, that a
law which was "all Penalty and no Reward" was self-defeating: by
compelling bankrupts to relinquish all property to some creditors
and then exposing them to perpetual imprisonment by others, it
encouraged evasion by even traders who would otherwise be will-
ing to cooperate. In other words, what had changed was parlia-
ment's perception not of the object of the process but of the meth-
ods by which it could be obtained ....'"
The linkage between bankruptcy law and collection law was
strengthened in 1842 by the addition of the bankruptcy notice to the list
of acts of bankruptcy.' 50 In so doing Parliament provided creditors with
an additional collection tool-the threat of bankruptcy sanctioned by
the bankruptcy court.' It is not suggested that bankruptcy, as con-
trasted with the issuance of a bankruptcy notice, is a preferred collec-
tion technique for most creditors. Bankruptcy is a costly process that
has relatively little utility for creditors who stand on the lower rungs of
the distribution ladder.15 2 But the commercial community's apprecia-
tion that the threat of bankruptcy can be used to its advantage has
created a legal environment which, when compared to that prevailing
in the United States, is relatively hostile to changes favoring debtors.
To suggest that England has a different discharge policy because it is
less tolerant of debt creation' does not satisfactorily explain the situa-
tion. It is more accurate to say that bankruptcy has been a collection
device for so long that it is difficult for someone in England to appreci-
ate the sharp distinction we draw between bankruptcy and collection
law. This perception of bankruptcy has often influenced England to
move cautiously in according greater protection to debtors."'
"19 Duffy, English Bankrupts, 1571-1867, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 286-87 (1980).
150 An Act for the Amendment of the Law of Bankruptcy, 5 & 6 Vict., ch. 122, § 13 (1842).
'51 See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
152 Bankruptcy is, however, a collection device of considerable significance for government
agencies such as the Inland Revenue Service because the bankruptcy statute provides that such
claims have first priority in distribution of the debtor's assets. See CORK, FINAL REPORT, supra
note 28, T 727 (in England 30-35% of all bankruptcy petitions are filed by government agencies).
153 See, e.g., Joslin, Bankruptcy: Anglo-American Contrasts, 29 MOD. L. REV. 149, 151-52
(1966) (noting differences in the economic background of the United States and England as reason
for disparate approaches).
154 It has not, however, prevented England from going further or moving faster than the
United States in providing greater protection for debtors when the utility of bankruptcy as a
collection device is not threatened by the reform. This is why it is a mistake to view the differences
in discharge policy simply in terms of liberality or frugality. For instance, England abolished
[Vol. 131:69
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If a similar firm linkage between bankruptcy and debt collection
ever had been established in the United States, the history of discharge
policy here might have been far different. But that linkage was never
established, in part because the responsibility for enacting bankruptcy
laws and collection laws was assigned to different governmental units:
bankruptcy was the province of the federal government while the enact-
ment of collection laws was left to the states.'55 This division of respon-
sibilities between state and federal governments added a dimension
never present in England to the conflict over reconciliation of debtor
and creditor interests. During the nineteenth century the United States
had four federal bankruptcy acts. State distrust of a powerful federal
government was a significant factor in the prompt demise of the first
three.
156
Virtually all state laws [regulating the debtor-creditor rela-
tionship] operated to the procedural, and often the substantive, dis-
advantage of out-of-state lenders. Moreover, the provisions of these
laws were patchwork personified, ranging from the stern Black-
stonian canon making a debtor liable with his "body, lands, and
goods" to a variety of emendations, some humanitarian and some
gratuitous reaffirmations of discharge debts in 1849, more than a century before the U.S. Congress
adopted an approach that still provides less effective protection to discharged debtors. See 11
U.S.C. § 524(c), (d) (Supp. V 1981); Boshkoff, The Bankrupt's Aoral Obligation to Pay His
Discharged Debts: A Conflict Between Contract Theory and Bankruptcy Policy, 47 IND. L.J. 36,
46-48 (1971). The English also provided for voluntary bankruptcy proceedings at an earlier date.
See An Act to amend and consolidate the Law relating to Bankrupts, 12 & 13 Vict., ch. 106, § 93
(1849). The United States did not authorize voluntary petitions until 1867. See 14 Stat. 517, § 11
(1867). Finally, since 1883 English bankruptcy judges have been able to grant a discharge to the
truly unfortunate debtor no matter how seriously he has misbehaved, although no such power is
vested in American bankruptcy judges even today. Note that none of these changes diminishes the
utility of bankruptcy as a collection device. The two features of American bankruptcy law which
lessen its utility as a collection device, a liberal exemption policy and a limited discharge provision,
do not play a significant role in the English process.
15s Interestingly, in 1898 the lack of linkage between federal bankruptcy legislation and state
collection laws was cited as a reason for not enacting permanent bankruptcy legislation by a
United States Senator who believed that an integration of the two laws was desirable.
Bankruptcy laws are a part of the system of collection laws in foreign coun-
tries. They dovetail into and supplement the collection laws; hence their adaptabil-
ity can be regulated intelligently; but with us the Federal Government has exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject of bankruptcy laws, while the various States control the
collection laws. The collection laws of this country . . . are as dissimilar as the
topography of the States, and more so than their unevenly developed civil agencies.
No general bankruptcy law can supplement them, because of their lack of uni-
formity. No country that does not control the collection laws can successfully main-
tain bankruptcy laws. This is peculiarly true respecting this Government, on ac-
count of its unique relation to the States. It is impossible for any general
bankruptcy bill to operate with that fairness and equality in this country that is
necessary to its pernamency.
31 CONG. REC., pt. 2, at 1849 (1898) (remarks of Sen. Crumpacker).
1- M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 172 (1977); see also S.W. DUNSCOMB, supra note 108, at
139-50. The classic study of the struggle for a national bankruptcy statute is C. WARREN, supra
note 8. A shorter treatment of the subject is found in P. COLEMAN, supra note 146, at 16-30.
1982]
108 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
otherwise. The proposal that this disarray be replaced with a na-
tional bankruptcy act provoked what [Joseph Story, a strong cham-
pion of a national bankruptcy statute and later a Justice of the
United States Supreme Court] would later call a "strange medley
of the most opposite views."
There were many lines of cleavage in the controversy. Liberal
construction of the Constitution collided with strict. British prece-
dent traversed the American sense of experiment. Debtors and
creditors were found on both sides of the status quo, depending on
the laws of particular states. Some jurisdictions gave the real estate
of planters and farmers almost complete immunity from execution.
Others afforded a creditor the most summary methods of jailing his
debtor on initial process and keeping him imprisoned virtually for
life. Each set of advantages might be lost if a national bankruptcy
law were enacted, and this lent a special interest to the question of
the relationship between the bankruptcy powers given the federal
government by the Constitution and the residual right of states to
provide for insolvency, to free the person and property of debtors
from oppressive claims, and to regulate process and procedure in
their own courts . .. .15
By 1898 it had become clear that an expanding national commerce
required the enactment of a federal statute that uniformly regulated at
least some aspects of the debtor-creditor relationship. Creditors were
clamoring for a national bankruptcy act and were more willing than
ever before to make concessions to obtain it. It was in this atmosphere
that a new balance between debtor and creditor interests was struck.
The main debate in Congress centered on two issues. First, debtor
interests desired only a voluntary act while creditors sought a statute
permitting only involuntary petitions. In the end, a compromise was
achieved and both types of proceedings were authorized. 151 Second, con-
gressmen receptive to the creditor position apparently came to the con-
clusion that they had to break sharply with English tradition in fash-
ioning an appropriate discharge rule.159 If they did not, there was little
157 G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 145-46
(1970).
1" The compromise gave special protection to agrarian interests, which wanted only a volun-
tary statute. Even today a farmer may not be the subject of involuntary proceedings. 11 U.S.C. §
303(a) (Supp. V 1981).
159 The congressional debates are curiously silent on this issue. There was no attempt to
secure adoption of the English conditional discharge system. One can only conclude that the credi-
tor forces had decided that this was a battle that could not be won. Even Jay Torrey, a St. Louis
lawyer and architect of the pro-creditor version of the proposed new statute, see C. WARREN,
supra note 8, at 134, came to the early conclusion that a new approach to discharge policy was
necessary. In a speech delivered to the National Association of Credit Men in Kansas City during
the summer of 1897, he indicated a willingness to make this concession to debtor interests:
A wise public policy justifies the discharge of honest insolvents; it does not justify
[Vol. 131:69
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hope of securing sufficiently widespread support for a national statute.
The creditor-consent provisons provisions in the short-lived Bankruptcy
Act of 1867 had been unpopular. Therefore, in the opening debate on
the pro-creditor Torrey Bill, Senator Lindsay of Tennessee signaled a
new approach to discharge policy:
In the course of the consideration of the subject, there has
been more or less discussion as to whether discharges should be
conditioned upon the payment by an estate of a certain percentage,
or upon the consent of a certain proportion of the creditors ...
The fact is that a discharge can be justified only upon the grounds
of sound public policy; that is, the State is more interested in hav-
ing an honest debtor relieved from obligations he can not meet, and
given an opportunity to better support and educate his family and
accumulate property upon which to pay taxes, than in having him
held in financial bondage forever by individual creditors. The
binding obligation of a contract ought not to be annulled except on
this ground. . . . The true doctrine is that no dishonest debtor
should receive a discharge, no matter what percentage his estate
pays or what number of his creditors have been induced to assent;
but, on the other hand, every honest debtor should be discharged,
irrespective of the money value of his estate or the assent of his
creditors.160
Clearly, the division of responsibility between Congress and the
states would not have led to adoption of a new discharge policy if all
the senators and representatives had held pro-creditor views. But the
dramatic westward expansion which occurred during the nineteenth
century produced a sectionalism that eventually favored debtor inter-
ests. The most obvious evidence of a new regional attitude toward debt
is found in the laws of many western states exempting homesteads and
the discharge of those who are dishonest. This public policy is not concerned with
the value of the estate, but only with the honesty of the citizen who is to be bene-
fited by the discharge ...
. . . [T~he public is not so much interested in having a citizen pay his debts as
it is in having him provide for his dependents, keepling] them from becoming a
public charge. . . . Under one of the former bankruptcy laws the payment of 50
per cent . . . was required in order to get a discharge. But it was found that it
could not be justified, and hence the law was amended, and this requirement omit-
ted from it. It would not work well in practice to say that a given debtor was
entitled to a discharge because of the value of his estate, and that another of equal
moral worth could not have a discharge because his estate had be [sic] sold under
unfavorable circumstances and the net result was not of the required amount. It is,
therefore, not right nor feasible to grant a discharge upon any ground other than
the honesty of the debtor applying for it.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN, S. EXEC. DOC. No. 156, 55th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1898).
160 30 CONG. REC., pt. I, at 603 (1898).
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other assets from forced sale to satisfy creditor claims. These laws were
tangible evidence of a community sentiment that there were certain
matters more important than the repayment of debt.161
This attitude toward the repayment of debt was well recognized
by those who sought a new bankruptcy law. State-created exemptions
were also recognized in federal bankruptcy proceedings.162 Indeed, dur-
ing congressional debates over the new bankruptcy legislation, not even
the most ardent champion of creditor interests suggested a continuation
of the conditional discharge rule found in former bankruptcy statutes.
The abandonment of this important principle, which had governed
debtor-creditor relations in the opening years of the Republic, was com-
plete and, strikingly, without much comment. Creditor interests wanted
a national law that would survive for more than a few years, and they
wanted a statute that provided for involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.
To gain these objectives they were willing to yield to debtors the right
to institute voluntary proceedings and to abandon the conditional dis-
charge rules; indeed, they abandoned the conditional discharge princi-
ple without the slightest expression of regret.
The fragmentation of legislative responsibility between the na-
141 Two centuries before, the then rapidly expanding colonies on the eastern seaboard had
reacted against imprisonment for debt on pragmatic grounds:
The inability of the legal order to distinguish between the patently dishonest
and the merely unfortunate soon forced legislatures in the New World as well as
the Old to re-evaluate the concept of imprisonment for debt. It became increasingly
evident that the institution was not working effectively. Though the threat of incar-
ceration must have kept some borrowers honest, imprisonment rarely pried loose
concealed property and only sometimes prompted friends or relatives to pay off the
debt. Since most defaulters were indigent, imprisonment reduced the ability to re-
pay by piling court and jail fees on top of the debt, cutting them off from gainful
employment, and by leaving their dependents to fend for themselves.
The debtors' prison provided no practical benefits to the general public either.
Though it did not necessarily cost anything to operate, it deprived the community of
valuable labor, something that colonial society could ill afford to lose. Imprisonment
also thinned the ranks of the militia, made it more difficult to keep fortifications in
good repair, and weakened colonial defense.
Moreover, the system often burdened the community with the cost of caring for
the debtor's dependents, and if or when the defaulter returned home he could be
broken in health no less than in spirit. Lacking all but the barest necessities for
survival, some never lifted themselves out of their poverty and lived out their
wretched lives as wards of the public or subsisted on private charity. Thus impris-
onment sometimes served the community as badly as it served creditors.
P. COLEMAN, supra note 146, at 250.
The western colonists of the nineteenth century were equally pragmatic in outlook. The ex-
emption laws, which originated in Texas, were "specifically meant to encourage immigration.
[They] sought, indirectly, through the office of security, to mobilize labor and capital toward the
prime job of the times: building population and enriching the land," L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 215 (1973), and permitted those who moved west to "retain . . . the feeling of
freedom and sense of independence which was deemed necessary to the continued existence of
democratic institutions." TEX. CONST. ANN. art. 16, § 50 (Vernon 1955).
162 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. V 1981)).
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tional and state governments strengthened the hand of debtor interests
in one other respect: It deferred for almost 100 years the moment when
our society had to strike a permanent balance between debtor and cred-
itor interests. During the nineteenth century, debtor-creditor law was
freewheeling: Each state chose the balance it thought appropriate for
local needs, and from time to time the federal government intervened
with temporary bankruptcy legislation. The United States Supreme
Court facilitated seven decades of this experimentation by ruling in
1827 that state insolvency laws remained in effect during periods when
there was no federal bankruptcy legislation."' 3 If the Court had invali-
dated state laws during periods of congressional inactivity, the demand
for federal legislation would have been much stronger. Moreover, a
statute enacted in the wake of such a decision-prior to the enactment
of state exemption laws; prior to the development of a powerful alliance
between debtors and western sectional interests; and prior to the full
development of adequate remedies for the collection of judgments at the
state level-most likely would have continued to rely on conditional dis-
charge rules. When bankruptcy proceedings were first instituted in
England, collection remedies were woefully inadequate. The proceed-
ings themselves were viewed as a response to the collection problem.
164
By the time that bankruptcy proceedings became a permanent part of
our federal statutory law, however, the creditor's arsenal of collection
devices was fully developed. 5 Thus, Congress was free to consider an-
other objective for bankruptcy proceedings-the return of the honest
debtor to productive society, free of the continuing control of both the
bankruptcy court and creditors. Earlier in the nineteenth century, this
country might well not have been ready to ignore the possibility of us-
ing bankruptcy as a collection device.
Americans during the nineteenth century participated in a turbu-
lent period of economic growth and territorial expansion. One by-prod-
uct of the dramatic westward movement was the creation of an elector-
ate which, eventually, would be able to insist upon a new direction in
discharge policy. The complex relationship between our national and
local governments resulted in a delay of almost 100 years before a per-
manent bargain could be struck between debtor and creditor interests.
65 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
'4 See supra text accompanying note 147.
115 See generally W.E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 152 (1975); Rie-
senfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law-A Historical Inventory and a Pro-
spectus, 42 IOWA L. REV. 155 (1957). Similarly, it has been suggested that the abolition of impris-
onment for debt became possible as more creditors' remedies became available. See G.P. Bauer,
The Movement Against Imprisonment for Debt in the United States 197-201 (1935) (unpublished
doctoral thesis available from Harvard University Archives).
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When the moment of decision finally arrived, creditor interests did not
have enough votes to secure all that they desired. In a very pragmatic
fashion, they chose not to press for a conditional discharge feature in
the new bankruptcy statute. For them, a permanent bill authorizing
involuntary proceedings was the prime objective. And so, almost by de-
fault, the link between payments to creditors and the debtor's entitle-
ment to a discharge ceased to exist in this country.
V. THE FUTURE OF DISCHARGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
Proposals for changes in the bankruptcy process are presently be-
ing circulated in both England and the United States. These proposals
do not arise from a common dissatisfaction with the way in which the
systems are functioning. Indeed, they are rooted in entirely different
concerns. In the United States, creditors are mounting a frontal assault
on the substantive law of discharge. They seek a return to the nine-
teenth century model of the debtor-creditor relationship. Abroad, there
is a movement to restructure the administrative framework within
which bankruptcy proceedings are conducted. Because the English pro-
posals are not yet fully developed,166 this part of the Article will deal
only with suggested changes in American discharge policy.
The compromise effected by the Bankrtupcy Act of 1898167 was
not a lasting one. Current legislation before Congress represents the
third time in this century that creditors have made a serious attempt to
substitute rules of condition for rules of limitation as the foundation of
American discharge policy. The first attempt to accomplish this oc-
curred in 1932. At that time, creditors urged that the discharge of the
debtor be suspended for a period of two years unless there were suffi-
16 In 1977, the then-incumbent Labor Government established an Insolvency Law Review
Committee, headed by Mr. (now Sir) Kenneth Cork. The Cork committee was given a broad
charge to review all the laws relating to insolvency and bankruptcy in England and Wales and to
make recommendations for appropriate changes. The committee's report recommended that a
multi-track insolvency process replace the present personal bankruptcy proceeding. Under the
Cork proposal most debtors would not have to submit to a public examination and would not be
subject to the control of the Official Receiver. The current rigorous procedure would be reserved
"for the comparatively few serious cases." CORK, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, $ 554. See gener-
ally id. 272-348, 553, 599, 610-614 & 715; CORK, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 39, at 3, 5-7.
The current Conservative Government, which came into power after the Cork Committee
began its deliberations, has expressed its own ideas regarding bankruptcy law reform. In a Con-
sultative Document released the same day as the Cork Interim Report, the Thatcher Government
viewed the bankruptcy system from a fiscal perspective and proposed to transfer much of the
responsibility for funding the administrative costs of bankruptcy from the public to the private
sector. It suggested that the Official Receiver in all cases be replaced by a private receiver, ap-
pointed by the court upon the nomination of the debtor in a voluntary case and the petitioning
creditor[s] in an involuntary proceeding. The petitioner[s] would be obligated to underwrite the
cost of this private official. See TRADE BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, at 7-8.
'7 See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
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cient assets to pay creditors fifty cents on the dollar or the debtor could
show that bankruptcy was caused by circumstances for which the
debtor could not justly be held responsible. During this period of sus-
pension the debtor would be obligated to turn over to the bankruptcy
trustee all nonexempt property and future income beyond that needed
for necessary business and living expenses.""8 This legislation provoked
some emotional responses169 and was never reported out of committee.
In 1938, however, Congress did provide an effective" ° vehicle for allo-
cating the debtor's future income among creditors when it authorized
the institution of proceedings under a new Chapter XIII. Wage earners
were permitted to propose composition and extension plans"' that,
prior to court approval, had to be accepted by a majority in number
and amount of all affected unsecured creditors. 72
The enactment of Chapter XIII marked the reintroduction of rules
of condition into American bankruptcy legislation. But the power given
to creditors by this congressional action was in no sense comparable to
the power conferred by the creditor-consent provisions of previous
American bankruptcy statutes or by British discharge practice. Chapter
XIII was entirely voluntary, 73 and debtors were still entitled to use
58' Uniform System of Bankruptcy: Joint Hearings On S. 3866 Before Subcomms. of House
and Senate Comms. on the Judiciary, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01 (1932).
1e1 It is shocking that an American Congress could ever foist upon a liberty-loving
people such a document as has been here drafted. Although I have not read all the
bankruptcy laws of the country, I have been reading them for about 19 years and
have written about them, and still know very little. I would like for anyone to show
to this committee that in any country having a constitutional protection of life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness which we have, any bankruptcy act that contains
the stringent provisions of this proposed amendment, something that is absolutely
out of step with our conception of liberty.
We seem to have gone so far in this country that we are apparently willing to
foist upon the public an act that absolutely destroys all exemptions guaranteed
under the constitutions of the several States, and that makes a free-born American
citizen come into court and stultify himself by telling what money he needs for
clothing, food and shelter for his family. How far have we gone in this country
when Congress will even consider such a proposition as that? I can well imagine
the founders of this Republic, Jefferson and Washington and others, turning over in
their graves to think that their fellow-citizens should be required to come into court
at specific intervals and report to referees whose salaries are fixed by Washington,
in the presence of the representatives of the man who fixes the salaries, with the
great power of this Government against them. It is a shocking thing to think that an
American citizen is required to come into court and explain to the court how much
he needs for food and shelter and clothing for his family.
Id. at 546-47 (statement of M. Feibelman).
17 A similar proceeding had been authorized five years earlier but it was not effective be-
cause it failed to give the court jurisdiction over the debtor's wages or provide for a discharge. See
Woodbridge, Wage Earners' Plans in the Federal Courts, 26 MINN. L. REV. 775, 775-76 (1942).
'71 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Act of June 22, 1938, ch.
575, § 622, 52 Stat. 883, 931 (repealed 1979).
17 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 652(1), 52 Stat. 883, 934.
173 Id. § 622, 52 Stat. 883, 929.
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traditional liquidation bankruptcy with its rules of limitation.
Predictably, the creditors' next move was an attempt to obtain
mandatory Chapter XIII proceedings. In 1965, legislation introduced
in the House called for a dismissal of a petition in liquidation bank-
ruptcy if the debtor failed to show that adequate relief could not be
obtained through the use of Chapter XIII."'4 The Senate bill" 5 was
even more favorable to creditors, giving them a right to force conversion
to Chapter XIII if the court found such action to be "feasible and de-
sirable, and for the best interests of the creditors." But once again,
enough votes could not be mustered to alter the course of American
discharge policy."' 6
Shortly thereafter, the Bankruptcy Commission began its compre-
hensive review of American bankruptcy legislation. And once more, the
desirability of relying solely on rules of limitation was affirmed:
Dishonest resort to the bankruptcy process and dishonest conduct
and anticipation of its use, by debtor or creditor, should be de-
terred and sanctioned directly by denial of relief and by criminal
prosecution and conviction. Punishing debtor dishonesty and in-
competence by such disabilities as "conditional discharge" or "un-
discharged status," imposed on ex-bankrupts under the laws of Ca-
nada, England, and other nations, is not appropriate in this
country. These sanctions have the effect of placing legal restraints
on the debtor's renewed participation in the open credit economy.
They are also incompatible with the fundamental characteristic of
the open credit economy that participation is determined by eco-
nomic considerations, not legal controls. Thus they are also incom-
patible with the fresh start policy that aims to support the goals of
the open credit economy.
17 7
Curiously, the Bankruptcy Commission was not entirely faithful
to this statement. Tucked away in section 4-506(a)(8) of its proposed
statute was an exception from discharge for "any educational debt if
the first payment of any installment thereof was due on a date less than
five years prior to the date of the petition and if its payment from fu-
ture income or other wealth will not impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and his dependents."''1 8 In a comment, the Commission provided
some guidelines for determining the dischargeability of such a debt:
In order to determine whether nondischargeability of the debt will
174 H.R. 292, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
175 S. 613, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
17M For a good discussion of these proposals, see Comment, supra note 10, at 541-43.
177 BANKRUPTCY REPORT, supra note 10, pt. I, at 83.
178 Id., pt. II, at 136.
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impose an "undue hardship" on the debtor, the rate and amount of
his future resources should be estimated reasonably in terms of
ability to obtain, retain, and continue employment and the rate of
pay that can be expected. Any unearned income or other wealth
which the debtor can be expected to receive should also be taken
into account. The total amount of income, its reliability, and the
periodicity of its receipt should be adequate to maintain the debtor
and his dependents, at a minimal standard of living within their
management capability, as well as to pay the educational debt. 17
In 1976, Congress, using somewhat different language to accom-
plish the same result, provided special nondischargeable status for cer-
tain educational debts. 18 0 Putting aside the question whether educa-
tional creditors should receive any special treatment,181 we can see that
the true significance of the Commission's recommendation and Con-
gress's response is found in the technique adopted to reconcile debtor
and creditor interests. For the first time in seventy-eight years, eligibil-
ity for discharge in liquidation bankruptcy was linked with ability to
pay.
We should also note one other situation in which the bankruptcy
179 Id. at 140-41.
180 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976). Although this section was repealed in 1979, the special treat-
ment for educational loans was carried forward, in a slightly different version, into the discharge
provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981). See
generally Ahart, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201 (1978);
Kosel, Running the Gauntlet of "Undue Hardship"--The Discharge of Student Loans in Bank-
ruptcy, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 457 (1981); Note, Student Loan Bankruptcies, 1978 WASH.
U.L.Q. 593. The undue hardship rule is not exactly the same as the English conditional discharge
because the debtor is not obligated to make any specific payment. The debt is simply not dis-
charged and the creditor is permitted to employ traditional state collection devices. The rule does,
however, require a determination of the debtor's financial condition.
1s1 The justiification offered by the Bankruptcy Commission for its special treatment of stu-
dent loans seems rather weak.
A separate clause to provide for a limited nondischargeability of educational loan
debts is desirable for two kinds of reasons. First, a loan or other credit extended to
finance higher education that enables a person to earn substantially greater income
over his working life should not as a matter of policy be dischargeable before he has
demonstrated that for any reason he is unable to earn sufficient income to maintain
himself and his dependents and to repay the educational debt. Second, such a policy
cannot be appropriately carried out under any other nondischargeability provi-
sion. . . . [Dischargeability provisions currently in force] neither provide for
nondischargeability of debts incurred honestly which the debtor subsequently de-
cides not to pay nor distinguish between persons scheduling educational debts who,
under the general "fresh start" policy of the proposed Act, should and those who
should not be enabled to discharge them.
BANKRUPTCY REPORT, supra note 10, pt. II, at 140. A similar argument can be made to support
special treatment for other loans which enhance the quality of life. Indeed, extensions of credit
which help sustain life itself, for example, credit for expenses related to medical and hospital care
and food and clothing bills, would seem to present even stronger claims upon the debtor's future
income. But because the financial interests of the federal government were directly affected by
defaults on student loans, this particular recommendation of the Bankruptcy Commission attracted
special attention.
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court is now called upon to examine debtors' future earning power.
The new Bankruptcy Reform Act continues to provide many debtors
with the option they have had since 1938: They may choose liquidation
bankruptcy or may propose a composition with creditors under a re-
vised and retitled Chapter 13 (Adjustment of Debts of an Individual
With Regular Income)."8 2 As Congress considered this new Chapter
13, the question whether it should be mandatory was discussed once
again:
As under current law, Chapter 13 is completely voluntary. This
Committee firmly rejected the idea of mandatory or involuntary
Chapter XIII in the 90th Congress. The Thirteenth Amendment
prohibits involuntary servitude. Though it has never been tested in
the wage earner plan context, it has been suggested that a
mandatory Chapter 13, by forcing an individual to work for credi-
tors, would violate this prohibition. On policy grounds, it would be
unwise to allow creditors to force a debtor into a repayment plan.
An unwilling debtor is less likely to retain his job or to cooperate
in the repayment plan, and more often than not, the plan would be
preordained to fail."83
Although Congress rejected the view that debtors should be co-
erced into entering Chapter 13, it tried to make its use so attractive that
more debtors would wish to take advantage of this type of proceeding.
One consequent change was the elimination of any requirement that
creditors approve the plan."84 At the same time, Congress recognized
that some substitute form of debtor control was necessary. Creditors
now are protected against abuse of Chapter 13 by the requirement (1)
that they receive at least as much as they would in a liquidation bank-
ruptcy18 5 and (2) that the court find that the plan has been proposed in
"good faith."" Since most creditors would receive nothing in a Chap-
ter 7 (liquidation bankruptcy) proceeding, the main burden of prevent-
ing exploitation of Chapter 13 falls on the concept of good faith. Courts
are now struggling with the question whether a plan that proposes no
payments to unsecured creditors can still be in good faith."8 ' More im-
portantly, those courts which find that some payment is required must
182 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (Supp. V 1981).
183 H.R. REP. NO. 595, supra note 10, at 120. For a recent examination of the objections to
mandatory Chapter 13 proceedings, see Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 953, 986-91 (1981).
184 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 123.
185 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
188 Id. § 1325(a)(3).
187 For an argument that the term "good faith" has nothing to do with the level of payment,
see Cyr, The Chapter 13 "Good Faith" Tempest: Analysis and Proposal for Change, 55 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 271 (1981).
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still fix its appropriate level. What the debtor can afford to pay out of
future income is clearly the main factor to be considered in establishing
this level.18
The most recent development of interest is the introduction in both
the House and Senate of legislation which would expand dramatically
the use of rules of condition to determine eligibility for discharge. H.R.
4786 states simply: "an individual may be a debtor under Chapter 7 of
this title only if such individual cannot pay a reasonable portion of his
debts out of anticipated future income."1 9 If this bill passes, the debtor
who fails to meet this standard will be left to choose between the tender
mercies of state collection law and use of Chapter 13. If she selects the
latter option she must give her creditors whatever is necessary out of
her future income to obtain judicial approval of the composition
plan.19 0 S. 2000 is more elaborate 91 but provides the debtor with es-
sentially the same unpleasant choices.
Both bills seek to prevent alleged abuses192 of the bankruptcy pro-
S The literature on this topic is substantial. In addition to Cyr, supra note 187, see Hughes,
Chapter 13's Potential for Abuse, 58 N.C.L. REV. 831 (1980); Note, Good Faith, Zero Plans, and
the Purposes of Bankruptcy Code Chapter 13: A Legislative Solution to the Controversy, 61
B.U.L. REV. 773 (1981); Note, Payments to Unsecured Creditors Under Chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 57 IND. L.J. 189 (1982); Note, "Good Faith" and Confirmation of
Chapter 13 Composition Plans: Analysis and a Proposal, 65 MINN. L. REV. 659 (1981); Note,
Abusing Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Problem of Nonrepayment, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
941 (1980); Note, Filing for Personal Bankruptcy: Adoption of a "Bona Fide Effort" Test Under
Chapter 13, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 321 (1981).
199 H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as House bill].
"So Both the House bill and a counterpart bill before the Senate also propose language that
would impose a more demanding payment standard in Chapter 13 proceedings. See id. § 19(1),
(4); S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 19(a), (b) (1981) [hereinafter cited as Senate bill].
... The Senate bill, supra note 190, § 3, would amend 11 U.S.C. § 109 (Supp. V 1981) by
inserting the following language:
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this subsection, an individual
may not be a debtor under chapter 7 of this title if such individual can pay a
reasonable portion of his debts out of anticipated future income. For the purposes of
this paragraph, the term-
(a) "reasonable portion of debts" means a substantial percentage of the
total outstanding debt reflected upon the schedule of liabilities filed pursuant
to section 521(a)(1), excluding debts secured by a first mortgage or deed of
trust on the debtor's principal residence;
(b) "anticipated future income" means such income, if any, that the
debtor has a reasonable expectation of recieving, either from sources
which-
(i) are providing actual income at the time of the filing of the
petition, or
(ii) will provide income commencing upon a date certain within
twelve months following the filing of the petitions,
and which is not needed by the debtor for the support of himself and his
dependents.
(2) The provisions of this section shall not apply in any case where the court
finds that its application would impose undue hardship upon the debtor and the
debtor's dependents.
s See generally Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts
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cess. It is probably too soon, though, to reach a firm conclusion as to
whether or not substantial abuse exists because the Bankruptcy Reform
Act has been in effect for only three years. But anyone familiar with
the discharge process in England can reach some firm conclusions con-
cerning the practical consequences of establishing a link between ability
to pay and debtor rehabilitation.
It is absolutely clear that rules of condition which do not use a
fixed level of payment to determine eligibility for discharge inevitably
cause the judge to become an arbiter of the debtor's lifestyle. Applica-
tion of the undue hardship rule requires active intervention in the
debtor's affairs and a judgmental attitude toward bankruptcy, an atti-
tude that is traditional in England, but one which many American
bankruptcy judges may find difficult to assume. Some evidence of this
may already be found in decisions interpreting the "undue hardship"
requirement of section 523(a)(8)(B) and the "good faith" requirement
of section 1325(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.193 Fur-
thermore, findings of "undue hardship," "good faith," "reasonable por-
tion of debts," "needed by the debtor for support of himself and his
dependents," and the like will not lend themselves to systematic classifi-
cation.194 There are so many variations in the human condition that
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings on BRA of 1978].
"I See, e.g., In re De Angelis, [1978-81 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 67,082
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1979) (applying 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976) (current version at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. V. 1981)), the court concluded that the debtor was occupying premises
which were too expensive). Courts have considered factors other than ability to pay in determining
whether undue hardship exists. See Kosel, supra note 180, at 466-76. It is likely that ability to
pay eventually will become the predominant test.
I" The proposed Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1981, S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., §
128(b), reprinted in Senate Hearings on BRA of 1978, supra note 192, at 319, 407, purported to
provide some assistance to courts struggling to define good faith. The new statute would have
added a requirement that the plan also represent the debtor's bona fide effort. While the legislative
history made it clear that the zero payment plan was not to be the norm, it was not particularly
helpful in providing courts with guidance as to the appropriate level of payment. Each debtor's
situation is so idiosyncratic that a payment of 10% in one case may be adequate and a payment of
70% in another case may be unsatisfactory. The report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
S. REP. No. 150, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1981) recognized this situation:
"The bona-fide effort" requirement is responsive to the widespread concern
among creditors and judges alike that the provisions of chapter 13 as enacted inad-
vertently permitted plans to be confirmed that proposed little or no payments to
unsecured creditors. This is contrary to the historical spirit and intent of chapter 13
which was to afford the debtor the protection of the bankruptcy court while the
debtor worked out a plan to repay his creditors over a period of years out of his
future earnings. Thus, chapter 13 is a remedy for the individual with severe cash-
flow problems while chapter 7 would be available for the debtor who simply has no
present or foreseeable prospects of paying his debts at all ....
The "bona-fide effort" test is intended to require that the plan proposed by the
debtor is a real effort and not a half-hearted effort by the debtor to repay his credi-
tors. It means that the debtor should forego luxuries during the term of the plan.
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bankruptcy judges will be required to make highly individualized deci-
sions providing little or no guidance for .future use. One person's luxury
may be another person's necessity. The condition of debtors is so
unique that the development of meaningful budgeting standards in this
area is almost impossible. The English have been operating a condi-
tional discharge system for almost one hundred years and they have yet
to develop one single rule at the appellate level that can be used to
predict the level of payment required in any particular case.1"5 Dis-
charge rulings, in fact, are almost never appealed196 and the English
system places heavy reliance on the bankruptcy judge's determination
of what can humanely be required of any particular debtor. More than
five years of experience with the undue hardship rule for student loans
For most debtors some sacrifice and adjustments to the debtor's standard of living
will be required. There should be no such expenses as the purchase of new cars or
for that matter continuing to make payments on a nearly new car at the expense of
unsecured creditors under the plan. The courts should look at all the circumstances
of the debtor and, in some cases, require the debtor to pursue a more modest
lifestyle.
This is not to say that any court should require undue financial hardship of
the debtor during the plan. No arbitrary repayment levels should be required by
judges, neither should trustees be permitted to require a certain level of payments in
return for not opposing confirmation.
There must be room in chapter 13 for the debtor on welfare or old-age assis-
tance who can only pay a nominal amount. There should not be room for the sin-
gle-payment plan or the new college or the professional school graduate seeking a
new start at the expense of his creditors and future generations of students. In some
cases courts should require the debtor to repay his unsecured creditors in full, but
that should not necessarily become the norm as it was in many jurisdictions under
the Bankruptcy Act.
In short, chapter 13 must be a legitimate alternative for the debtor in financial
difficult who honestly wants to pay his debts. If this is the case, then the debtor's
own creditors will encourage the debtor to seek the alternative and the maximum
repayment to all creditors will be achieved.
What is notable in this statement is not how much it tells us but rather how little information
it supplies. Although this amendment is designed to address one of the most controversial bank-
ruptcy issues of recent times, all the subcommittee can do is offer one firm rule: zero payment
plans are not to be the norm in all Chapter 13 cases. After that, the statement becomes very vague.
The report states that a "real," not "half-hearted," effort is required. Most (but not all) debtors
must make "some sacrifice and adjustment to [their] standards of living." In some cases "a more
modest life style" is required but "this is not to say that any court should require undue financial
hardship of the debtor during the plan." One can hardly blame bankruptcy judges if they are
dizzy and a bit confused after digesting this morsel of legislative history.
S. 2000 also imposes a more rigorous repayment standard in Chapter 13. The explanation of
the standard is shorter than the one provided in S. 863 and equally unhelpful. See S. REP. No.
446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1982).
"' The few reported opinions deal with the appropriateness of a suspended discharge. See,
e.g., Re Smith, [1947] 1 All E.R. 769. Note further that in Mr. Registrar Hunt's decision, supra
text accompanying note 112, there is no explanation of how the amount of payment or the period
of suspension was determined.
1" I was informed that one bankruptcy official, who made, on the average, 50 discharge
decisions a month, had been subject to only two appeals from from a discharge ruling in 14 years.
Moreover, neither appeal concerned the propriety of a condition of payment or a period of
suspension.
1982]
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suggest that American appellate courts will show similar deference for
the trial court's decision.
197
Few American judges will welcome such a responsibility:
It is regrettable that Congress shed so inadequate a spotlight
on the exculpating phrase "undue hardship". What can be gleaned
is that the hardship is to be found in the exceptional case and must
be based on something more than present inability to pay. It is also
regrettable that so much is therefore left to the individual view of
each judge who, after all, brings a sum of who and what he was,
what he has become, and what he sees through his own eyes to this
basically disagreeable task.198
Why should the determination of undue hardship be a "basically
disagreeable task"? At first glance it appears to be no more difficult
than the application of any other legal rule providing the judge with
only general guidance as to its content. We would not so characterize
the determination of whether a contract is unconscionable,' 99 whether a
creditor had reasonable cause to believe that a debtor was insolvent,2'
or whether a creditor reasonably relied2 ' on a false financial statement,
'9 No circuit court has reversed a lower court's finding that repayment would constitute
undue hardship. But see In re Andrews, 661 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1981) (court remanded the case,
holding that the trial court had improperly failed to consider certain evidence, but carefully
avoided expressing any opinion as to whether undue hardship actually existed).
Bankruptcy Rule 810 requires the reviewing authority to accept the bankruptcy court's find-
ing of facts unless they are "clearly erroneous." 11 U.S.C. app.-Bankr. R. 810 (1976). Findings
of law, however, are not entitled to such deference and may be set aside if the reviewing authority
disagrees with the lower court's conclusion. In re Meade Land & Dev. Co., 527 F.2d 280, 282-83
(3d Cir. 1975) (appeal of bankruptcy court's award of legal fees to counsel for the receiver and
trustee of the bankrupt). The determination of whether the payment of an educational loan im-
poses an undue hardship may be classified as either a question of law or as a mixed question of
law and fact. In the latter instance there is disagreement among the circuits as to the appropriate
standard of review. The Second and Fifth Circuits adhere to the position that such determinations
are not subject to the clearly erroneous standard. In re Hygrade Envelope Corp., 366 F.2d 584,
588-89 (2d Cir. 1966); Mayo v. Pioneer Bank and Trust Co., 297 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1961).
Contra Snider v. England, 374 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1967). See also 9 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2589 (1971); Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial
and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1020, 1042-43 (1967). In time, courts may
hesitate to overturn lower court dispositions of the undue hardship issue no matter how they are
styled. Today, there are some basic unresolved questions as to the meaning of the term. For in-
stance, should the court consider the proportion of educational and noneducational debts? Is saving
to be permitted? These are questions to which there should be a uniform response within the
circuits and, one hopes, across the country. Unfortunately, appellate review of exactly how much a
debtor can afford to pay her creditors following an initial nonarbitrary determination by the bank-
ruptcy judge is hard to justify. Each case will be too idiosyncratic to have precedential value and
judges will eventually realize that active appellate intervention is not an appropriate use ofjudicial
resources. For a contrary view advocating free appellate review of such determinations, see id. at"
1032-35.
,98 New York State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp. v. White, 6 Bankr. 26, 29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1980) (citations omitted).
'" U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978).
2- 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1981).
'0' Id. § 523(a)(2)(B)(iii).
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even though these standards are as vague as "undue hardship." Such
determinations may be difficult; they are not disagreeable. It can be
argued, however, that finding undue hardship is a disagreeable task
because it requires the court to pass judgment, in a very personal fash-
ion, on the debtor's future conduct. The judge does not simply deter-
mine whether past conduct satisfies a legal standard, but instead, be-
comes an architect of the debtor's future. When we also recognize that
the court is passing judgment on the debtor's lifestyle, the controversial
and often disagreeable nature of the task is easily seen. It is the intru-
siveness of the decision that is so significant. The judge's difficulties are
compounded by the fact that there is no general consensus on how we
ought to live or eat or allocate our resources;20 2 the judge is being asked
to participate in planning the debtor's future without the guidance of
any generally accepted principles of law. The paternalism implicit in
such a process is extraordinary.
Consider, for example, the debtor's expenditure for housing. It
will ordinarily be a substantial budget item. If savings can be achieved,
creditors may benefit. Should the court tell the debtor to occupy more
modest accommodations? Several courts have already responded in the
affirmative. One case involved a debtor who preferred to live in a cer-
tain neighborhood and incurred larger rental payments than normal for
a person of her income level. The court refused to consider the excess in
determining whether there was undue hardship.203 The message was
clear: her lifestyle must change. A second court delivered a more direct
message when the issue was whether the debtors had proposed to pay
creditors a sufficient amount under a Chapter 13 plan.2 °' No payment
was provided for unsecured creditors. The judge observed that the debt-
ors were occupying both apartments in a two-family house. If they
rented out the upper apartment they could increase their cash flow by
approximately $310 per month; however, this would require five people
to share three bedrooms in the first floor apartment. The judge then
found a lack of good faith and denied confirmation of the plan. The
debtors were given two weeks to submit a new plan in which payments
were increased by $310 per month.20 5
202 Congress, for example, cannot even agree on a comprehensive expenditure budget for
families at the poverty level. Food expenditures necessary to maintain scientifically established
nutrition standards are the only item on which there is a consensus. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, THE MEASURE OF POVERTY 21-24 (1976). Even this apparent con-
sensus is misleading, however, because there is some disagreement over what the proper nutrition
standard should be.
203 In re De Angelis [1978-81 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (COH) 67,082 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1979).
20" In re Manning, 5 Bankr. 1231 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1980).
205 Other housing-expense cases are In re Brown, 18 Bankr. 219, 224 (Bankr. D. Kan.
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If creditors have the opportunity to ask for a modification of the
debtor's lifestyle, it appears clear that they will use it. A paraplegic
may have nothing to fear,206 but most debtors can expect many de-
mands to change their living habits. After housing, the automobile is
the most likely candidate for the judicial scalpel.20 7 But we all make
numerous budgetary decisions each week and it is hard to imagine
many which can not be challenged. Is dog food for the family pet a
necessity?20 What are we to think of telephone service,209 legal repre-
sentation,210 life insurance,211 reading material,21 private education, 1 3
clothing,214 charitable contributions,215 psychotherapy, 21 6 a desire to as-
1982) (monthly rent of $650 is excessive); In re Packer, 9 Bankr. 884, 887 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1981) (rent of $330 per month is excessive in light of fact that debtor knew his debt would come
due).
t" Mr. Butler. I am concerned and interested in your thought. You do mention the
undue hardship exception. Payment of indebtedness is always a hardship; at least
that has always been my experience. What is an undue hardship in your thought
with reference to a student loan?
Mr. Erlenborn. This is something decided case by case. It is very difficult to spell
out in the statute.
Mr. Butler. Do you have any statutory suggestions?
Mr. Erlenborn. I don't have any statutory suggestions. If after graduating from
school, an individual becomes a paraplegic and earning capacity was impaired,
there might be a finding of hardship.
BANKRUPTCY ACT REVISION, supra note 9, at 1092 (emphasis added).
'07 See, e.g., In re Wegfehrt, 10 Bankr. 826, 831 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (court allowed
discharge, in part because debtor had no "excess" expenditures such as car payments); In re Pack-
er, 9 Bankr. 884, 887 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (car not necessary because debtor lives near mass
transit); In re Rossotto, 10 Bankr. 378, 380 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (debtor's auto-related ex-
penditures not necessary to maintain him at reasonable standard of living); Perkins v. Vermont
Student Assist. Corp., 11 Bankr. 160, 161 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1980) (car held too expensive); In re
Ewell, 1 Bankr. 311, 313 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1979) (discharge denied because debtor paid off car debt
instead of student loan); In re Hayes, [1978-81 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1 67,065
(Bankr. W.D. Wisc. Mar. 2, 1979) (paying off debt on second car not undue hardship because
"not living within means"); In re Hayman, [1978-81 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1
67,064 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 1978) (second car is excessive).
'" Cf Senate Hearings on BRA of 1978, supra note 192, pt. I, at 111 ($120/month for
horse-boarding claimed to be excessive).
209 See id.; In re Rice, 13 Bankr. 614, 617 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981) ($30/month long-distance
phone bills factor showing that debtor's lifestyle is excessive); In re Packer, 9 Bankr. at 887.
210 See In re Rice, 13 Bankr. at 617.
212 See id.
2,' See In re Schongalla, 4 Bankr. 360, 363 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy-$1440 spent on reading material over three years indicates lack of good faith).
"" See In re Brown, 18 Bankr. at 219, 224; In re Price, I Bankr. 768 (Bankr. D. Hawaii
1980) (expenses for private education of debtor's children were excessive); In re Kammerud, 15
Bankr. 1, 10 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (court sympathizes with debtor's expenses incurred to get
private educational help for son).
214 See In re Brown, 18 Bankr. at 224; In re Dempsey, BK-78-18, (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Nov.
17, 1980).
.. See In re Breckenridge, 12 Bankr. 159 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (chapter 13 plan not
proposed in good faith where debtor paid church tithe); In re Townsend, [1978-81 Transfer
Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1 67,140 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1978) (debtor should reduce charita-
ble contributions by amount suffucient to eliminate debt).
316 See In re Packer, 9 Bankr. at 887 (not permitted where only job-related); In re Kam-
merud, 15 Bankr. at 1.
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sist children one is not legally obligated to support, 17 or a desire to
start a family218 or a new business?2"0 Are recreation expenses to be
regulated? 220 May one spouse discharge the other's debts? 221 Is the
debtor to be permitted to save any money to pay the future medical
expenses of a child with an incurable disease? 22 2 It has been suggested
that proposals to reach the debtor's future income are objectionable be-
cause the debtor will not cooperate and will not produce future in-
come.22 1 It is more likely that such proposals are objectionable because
they will work too well and completely undermine the fresh-start policy
that has been pursued in this country since 1898.
The English system of conditions and suspensions, in some re-
spects, certainly provides an approach to discharge policy generally
preferable to the traditional American approach. It is more sensible
from a distributional point of view because it contains few exceptions to
discharge. We tend to think of exceptions to discharge in a bilateral
fashion, as a matter of equity between debtor and creditor. But if the
debtor has postpetition resources that are to be applied to creditors'
claims, we should also reflect on the legitimacy of preferring one credi-
tor over another. Consider, for example, the case in which the debtor
has given a false financial statement in order to purchase a television
set on credit. This debt is not discharged by bankruptcy. 224 The debtor
also has an unpaid hospital bill for a lifesaving operation. This claim
will be discharged.225 Both claims are treated equally for the purposes
of distributing whatever property the debtor owns at the date of the
petition. 2 8 But the exception to discharge gives the seller of the televi-
sion set a distributional advantage if the debtor has postpetition re-
sources. This result seems wrong on the merits and is inconsistent with
the treatment of the debtors' claims while the bankruptcy proceeding is
pending. There is less need for such exceptions to discharge in a condi-
217 See In re Rice, 13 Bankr. at 614.
218 See supra text accompaying notes 119-22 (Hearing Number Three).
219 See In re Rossotto, 10 Bankr. at 378 (desire to start a new business increases debtor's
chances for future financial success, which in turn is a factor weighing against granting a
discharge).
220 See In re Brown, 18 Bankr. at 224; In re Schongalla, 4 Bankr. at 363 ($2,160 spent for
recreation over three years is a factor indicating lack of good faith).
221 See In re Perkins, 11 Bankr. at 160 (debtor's payment as restitution for husband's bad
checks shows lack of undue hardship where husband has enough income to pay for himself).
222 The answer apparently is "no." See In re MacPherson, 19 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 178
(Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1978), criticized in 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 523.18 n.6 (L. King 15th
ed. 1982).
323 See supra text accompanying note 183.
224 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
'25 None of the exceptions found in 11 U.S.C. § 523 applies.
226 11 U.S.C. § 721(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
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tional system.
227
We may also approve of the flexibility of the English approach.
Forgiveness is possible. Even the most reprehensible debtor may reha-
bilitate herself. Although we seem to be moving in the same direction,
the American bankruptcy process today does not possess an equivalent
capacity for forgiveness. 228 This is a substantial shortcoming, but the
flexibility of the English process, the ability to respond to the facts of
an individual case, is purchased at a potentially high cost. The discre-
tion enjoyed by the judge in such a system provides an extraordinary
opportunity for debtor exploitation. The abstract proposition that there
should be no abuse of the discharge process commands support. But the
risk of implementing this policy through use of rules of condition and
suspension is directly related to the flexibility provided by such rules.
Those who oppose greater reliance on rules of condition have noted this
concern. 229 Proponents of legislation such as H.R. 4786 and S. 2000,
however, usually fail to advert to the problem230 or minimize the extent
to which the bankruptcy judge will be asked to become a manager of
the debtor's affairs.
231
All this is not to suggest that rules of condition and suspension
cannot work in the United States. Given the link between discharge
and distribution inherent in English discharge policy, one must admire
the skill with which English judges have harmonized the interests of
debtors, creditors, and society. Their approach to debtor relief, the
product of many years of experience, is a masterly blend of austerity,
pragmatism, and compassion. But the fact remains that the collection of
... See supra text accompanying notes 130-34. S. 2000 does not acknowledge this fact. In-
deed, it seeks to increase the exceptions to discharge in Chapter 13. See Senate bill, supra note
190, § 19.
2" A debtor who is denied a discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (Supp. V 1981) may
become eligible for a discharge in a subsequent proceeding. Debts that would have been dis-
charged if the debtor had received a discharge in the first proceeding, however, remain nondis-
chargeable even though the debtor subsequently receives a discharge. See id. § 523(a)(9). The
debtor may obtain relief from these obligations by successfully completing a Chapter 13 plan. Id. §
1328(a).
2" See Senate Hearings on BRA of 1978, supra note 192, pt. I, at 300 (statement of Richard
Levin); id., pt. II, at 71 (statement of Phillip Schuchman), 72-73 (statement of Ellen Broadman),
& 145 (statement of Judge Dean Gandy).
20 The rules which the bankruptcy judge would use to determine the presence of excess
income are not described in testimony before Congress. See, Senate Hearing on BRA of 1978,
supra note 192, pt. I, at 6-12 (statement of Andrew F. Brimmer), 39-45 (statement of Jonathon
M. Landers), 106-09 (statement of Paul J. Pseilsticker), 153-55 (statement of Norman C.
Grant), 160-62 (statement of Richard F. Kerr); id., pt. II, at 11-17 (statement of James C. Barr),
17-22 (statement of Robert W. Johnson). Even the Purdue Study, supra note 9, does not attempt
to pass judgment on many individual expense items in reaching its conclusion that debtors can
afford to pay some portion of their nonmorgage debt. Instead, it relies heavily on a general stan-
dard of living using the Bureau of Census' definition of poverty.
131 See Senate Hearings on BRA of 1978, supra note 192, pt. II, at 38 (statement of Claude
L. Rice).
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debts, not the immediate return of an honest debtor to productive soci-
ety, is the primary focus of English bankruptcy legislation. There can
be no doubt that English debtors as a class are currently subject to
more severe treatment than their American counterparts. Indeed, any
bankruptcy process which places heavy reliance on rules of condition
and suspension must operate in this fashion. And this is precisely the
point that supporters of H.R. 4786 and S. 2000 fail to confront. In-
deed, if the United States is ready, in large part, to abandon the fresh-
start policy first adopted by Congress in 1898, and further, is willing to
allocate responsibility for balancing the interests of debtors, creditors,
and society to the trial court judges, then these proposed bills are ap-
propriate. It is clear that passage of H.R. 4786, S. 2000, or similar
legislation, will signal the beginning of a new era in American dis-
charge policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Any bankruptcy law must, of necessity, be an accommodation be-
tween competing interests that include the creditor's desire to be paid,
the debtor's desire to escape a burdensome situation, the value society
places on having people pay their debts in full, and the value society
places on allowing debtors to start anew when overtaken by financial
misfortune. An accommodation can be made at different points on the
available spectrum of choices. Congress should be able to strike a new
balance between the interests of debtors, creditors, and society as it sees
fit to meet changing needs.
But before a new balance is struck, in this case by the denial of the
benefits of liquidation bankruptcy to those that some believe can pay
their debts, the consequences of such action should be understood. Our
knowledge of the English system and some experience with the condi-
tional discharge of educational debts in our country suggests that the
bankruptcy judge will be given almost unlimited power to determine
the lifestyle of a debtor who seeks a discharge. Whether this change
will produce a system which is any less or more desirable than that
which we have now depends upon one's values. It is probable that the
relative success or failure of a new approach to discharge policy will
depend, to a great extent, upon the humanity with which the bank-
ruptcy judges exercise the powerful discretion to be conferred upon
them. But on one point there should be agreement. If enacted, the
change currently being advocated before Congress will, in its own way,
be just as radical a shift in discharge policy as that which occurred
when Congress adopted a new bankruptcy statute in 1898.
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